Volume 126

Issue 3

Spring 2022

Unqualified Immunity and the Betrayal of Butz v. Economou: How
the Supreme Court Quietly Granted Federal Officials Absolute
Immunity for Constitutional Violations
Patrick Jaicomo
Anya Bidwell

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Law and
Race Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Writing and Research Commons, and the Supreme Court
of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Patrick Jaicomo & Anya Bidwell, Unqualified Immunity and the Betrayal of Butz v. Economou: How the
Supreme Court Quietly Granted Federal Officials Absolute Immunity for Constitutional Violations, 126
DICK. L. REV. 719 (2022).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlr/vol126/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-3\DIK302.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

3-MAY-22

12:34

Unqualified Immunity and the Betrayal
of Butz v. Economou: How the
Supreme Court Quietly Granted
Federal Officials Absolute Immunity for
Constitutional Violations
Patrick Jaicomo & Anya Bidwell*
ABSTRACT
Qualified immunity has been the subject of well-deserved
scorn in recent years as a legal mechanism that shields government officials from constitutional accountability. But its shadow
has hidden another mechanism that provides an unqualified immunity from constitutional accountability. That de facto absolute
immunity extends to federal officials in all but a vanishingly few
contexts where claims are still permitted under the 1971 Supreme
Court decision Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics. But it was not always that way.
In its 1978 decision Butz v. Economou, the Supreme Court
permitted Bivens claims to proceed against a cabinet-level federal official and others, denying their demands for absolute immunity. Butz detailed the historical availability of damages
against federal officials in the United States and warned that
holding them to a lower constitutional standard than their state
counterparts would turn the Founders’ constitutional design on
its head. In the years that followed, the Court consistently
demonstrated its continued commitment to federal-state constitutional parity. Most notably, the availability of Bivens claims
against federal officials was so well-established and robust in
1982 that the Court created qualified immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald to ameliorate policy concerns with Bivens liability. Citing
the need to treat federal and state officials consistently, the Court
formally extended qualified immunity to state officials a few
years later.
* Attorneys at the Institute for Justice and leaders of its Project on Immunity and
Accountability. The authors thank their colleagues, Daniel Rankin and Adam
Shelton, for providing substantial research for this Article.
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Over the intervening decades, the Court reversed course and
created a two-tier system of constitutional accountability. While
it continued to strengthen qualified immunity, often relying on
the existence of Bivens claims to do so, the Court simultaneously
sapped Bivens of its power, in effect cabining it to its precise
facts. As a result, there is no longer a reliable—let alone broad—
source of constitutional accountability for federal officers. Betraying Butz and the long history of federal accountability in the
United States, the modern Court has ushered in an era of increasingly absolute and unqualified immunity for federal
officials.
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INTRODUCTION
In its 1978 decision Butz v. Economou, the Supreme Court
warned that to create a legal system “in which the Bill of Rights
monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does that
of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head.”1
But over the four decades since, the Court has created just such a
legal system by dramatically restricting the availability of constitu1. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).

R
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tional claims against federal officials.2 Today, federal officials enjoy
de facto absolute immunity in all but three limited situations.3
Perhaps nothing better illustrates the Court’s inversion of the
Founders’ constitutional order than its creation of qualified immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.4 There, the Court used the broad availability of constitutional claims against federal officials under
Bivens5 to justify its creation of a policy-based qualified immunity
to those claims.6 Relying on the federal-state parity Butz identified,
the Court then extended qualified immunity to state officials several years later.7 As it was using decisions that presumed the availability of Bivens claims to increase the protections of qualified
immunity, the Court was restricting the availability of Bivens itself.8
Disregarding Butz’s proclamation that “[s]urely, federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of protection when they violate
federal constitutional rules than do state officers,”9 the Court now
grants absolute immunity to federal officials in most contexts. This
allows them to operate in “Constitution-free zones” across the
United States.10 Worse still, while qualified immunity is very much
alive and well,11 the cause of action the Court used to create and
expand qualified immunity—Bivens—is “practically a dead let2. See infra Section III.
3. See infra Section III.C.
4. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
5. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
6. See infra Section III.A. See generally William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity
Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018) (providing comprehensive overview of
qualified immunity); Steven I. Vladeck, The Inconsistent Originalism of JudgeMade Remedies Against Federal Officers, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1869, 1887–89
(2021).
7. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n.12 (1984).
8. Compare Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19 (justifying qualified immunity because “a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his
conduct”), with Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7–8 (2021) (per curiam)
(providing qualified immunity unless a plaintiff can provide, if not “a case directly
on point,” “existing precedent [from the Supreme Court or relevant circuit court
that] . . . place[s] the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate”), and
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395 (explaining “it is . . . well settled that where legal rights
have been invaded . . . federal courts may use any available remedy to make good
the wrong done”) (cleaned up), with Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017)
(describing the extension of a Bivens remedy against federal officials as “ ‘disfavored’ judicial activity” that the Court has not engaged in “for the past 30 years”).
See also infra Section III.
9. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 501 (1978).
10. Byrd v. Lamb, 990 F.3d 879, 884 (5th Cir. 2021) (Willett, J., concurring)
(“Bivens today is essentially a relic, technically on the books but practically a dead
letter, meaning this: If you wear a federal badge, you can inflict excessive force on
someone with little fear of liability.”).
11. See, e.g., City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9 (2021) (per curiam).
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ter.”12 Along with it, the Court has laid to rest the Founders’ understanding of constitutional limits and the judiciary’s role in enforcing
them.13
Section I of this Article describes that understanding and
traces America’s history of enforcing strict liability against federal
officers who exceeded their authority. Section II discusses the
Court’s comparative treatment of state and federal officers as particularly outlined in Butz v. Economou and the central role statefederal parity played in the Court’s development of modern immunity doctrines. And Section III discusses the Court’s creation of
qualified immunity and outlines the development of the law since
Bivens, Butz, and Harlow to illustrate how the Court has continuously used Bivens to expand qualified immunity while, at the same
time, restricting Bivens claims to create de facto absolute federal
immunity.
I. AT

THE

FOUNDING,

FEDERAL OFFICIALS WERE STRICTLY

LIABLE FOR ACTIONS THAT EXCEEDED THEIR
AUTHORITY.

From the dawn of the Republic, federal officials were responsible for injuries they caused acting outside their authority. The Supreme Court strictly imposed liability, considering it an essential
judicial task required by the separation of powers.
A.

By the time America declared independence from Britain,
damages remedies against government officials were well
established.

Freedom from the abuses of an unaccountable government and
its officials animated the American Revolution.14 Even before
American independence, British courts had approved damages actions against government officials as a tool to “make publick officers more careful” and ensure that every right had a
corresponding remedy.15 In Entick v. Carrington, for example, an
associate of John Wilkes won an award of damages against the
King’s messengers and Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, for the
messengers’ search of his home and papers under a general warrant
12. Byrd, 990 F.3d at 884 (Willett, J., concurring).
13. See infra Section I.
14. See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
15. Ashby v. White (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136–37; 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953,
956 (Holt, C.J., dissenting).
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issued by Halifax.16 As Lord Chief Justice Holt explained, permitting government officials to evade the limits of their authority
would be an impermissible act of judicial policymaking.17 The Constitution transported that ideal into the newly independent United
States.18
B. From the beginning, American courts embraced the
availability of damages against federal officials.
The Constitution empowered federal courts to award damages,
providing that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made.”19 Through that clause, “the
[C]onstitution of the United States appeals to, and adopts, the common law to the extent of making it a rule in the pursuit of remedial
justice in the courts of the Union.”20 And if the appropriate remedy
is damages, “the principles of decision, by which these remedies
must be administered, must be derived from the same source”—the
common law.21
English common law did not merely inspire American judicial
processes and jurisdiction.22 It also informed the substance of con16. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tri. 1029, 1063–64 (K.B.). Lord
Camden’s decision in Entick expressed the general principle that the government
and its agents may do nothing beyond what is expressly authorized by law, while
individuals may do anything not expressly forbidden by it. See id. at 1065–66. Demanding explicit justification for government action, Entick declared: “If it is law,
it will be found in our books. If it is not to be found there, it is not law. . . . [I]t is
now incumbent upon the defendants to show the law, by which this seizure is warranted. If that cannot be done, it is a trespass.” Id. at 1066.
17. Id. at 1067 (“What would the parliament say, if the judges should take
upon themselves to mould an unlawful power into a convenient authority, by new
restrictions? That would be, not judgment, but legislation.”).
18. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1963) (“If the subject was the victim of illegal
official action, in many cases he could sue the King’s officers for damages. . . . This
was the situation in England at the time the American Constitution was drafted.”);
id. at 20.
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1633 n.1 (1833) (noting that the first
draft of section two applied only to cases “arising under the laws passed by the
legislature of the United States” but was later expanded to encompass the
Constitution).
20. STORY, supra note 19, at § 1639.
21. Id. (specifying the common law “according to the known distinction in the
jurisprudence of England, which our ancestors brought with them upon their emigration, and with which all the American states were familiarly acquainted”).
22. Id. Justice Story explained that a “case” for purposes of Article III “is a
suit in law or equity, instituted according to the regular course of judicial proceedings; and, when it involves any question arising under the constitution, laws, or
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stitutional rights. Cases like Entick heavily influenced the Bill of
Rights.23 It is unsurprising, then, that the Supreme Court routinely
held federal officials liable for actions taken outside their constitutionally conferred authority.24 This was true regardless of whether
the official acted reasonably, in good faith, or with some other
claimed justification.25 “[P]ublic officers bore personal liability for
what were termed, in the legal vocabulary of the day, ‘positive’
torts—affirmative acts, willfully done, which amounted to a trespass
or other wrong.”26 In such cases, government officials were responsible to the same extent as private agents.27 Under “a very plain
principle of common sense and common justice . . . no person shall
shelter himself from personal liability, who does a wrong, under
color of, but without any authority . . . or by a negligent use or
abuse of his authority.”28
The Supreme Court issued a steady series of decisions throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries confirming these foundational
concepts of constitutional accountability.29 If a federal official exceeded his authority and violated individual rights, he was strictly
and personally liable for damages.30 As the Supreme Court detreaties of the United States, it is within the judicial power confided to the Union.”
Id. at § 1640 (citations omitted).
23. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–29 (1886) (“[E]very American
statesman, during our revolutionary and formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English freedom [Entick v. Carrington],
and considered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law . . . .”);
see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012).
24. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804); Bates v.
Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 204–06 (1877).
25. See, e.g., Little, 6 U.S. at 170 (“A commander of a ship of war of the
United States, in obeying his instructions from the President of the United States,
acts at his peril. If those instructions are not strictly warranted by law, he is answerable in damages to any person injured in their execution.”).
26. David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 16 (1972) (citing STORY, infra note 27, at
§ 320).
27. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 319 (5th
ed. 1857).
28. Id. at § 320 (“Where a person is clothed with authority, as a public agent,
it cannot be presumed, that the government meant to justify or even to excuse his
violations of his proper duty, under color of that authority.”); cf. Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 183–87 (1961) (holding government officials personally liable for actions taken under color of law).
29. See Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 491 (2020).
30. As the cases discussed in this section illustrate, suits against federal officials indirectly addressed excesses of authority. For example, a plaintiff would sue
a federal official in trespass; the official would claim federal authority to justify the
trespass; the plaintiff would reply that the trespass exceeded the official’s legal
authority; and the official’s justification defense would be defeated. See Akhil
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1506–07 (1987);
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clared in Marbury v. Madison: “The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first
duties of government is to afford that protection.”31
In 1804, the Court satisfied that duty in Little v. Barreme, approving a damages award against a naval officer who had seized a
ship on orders from the President.32 During the Quasi-War between
the United States and France, Congress enacted a statute directing
the interception of vessels suspected of sailing to French ports, but
the President ordered the seizure of vessels sailing to or from
French ports.33 Captain George Little executed that order, capturing a Danish brigantine called Flying Fish that was suspected of departing from a French port in the Caribbean. The vessel’s owner
sued for her return and damages from Captain Little.34 The lower
courts granted both,35 and the Supreme Court affirmed.36 Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall explained that because presidential “instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or
legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a
plain trespass . . . Captain Little then must be answerable in damages to the owner of this neutral vessel.”37
see also Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1128–29
n.89 (1969) (collecting cases); Engdahl, supra note 26, at 17 n.71 (collecting cases).
Claims against federal officials were litigated in both federal and state courts, and
courts held officials personally liable if their actions lacked an adequate legal basis
or contravened the Constitution. See id. at 17–18.
31. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). The Court further
elaborated, “In Great Britain the king himself is sued . . . and he never fails to
comply with the judgment of his court.” Id. Marbury reaffirmed Lord Chief Justice
Holt’s pre-Revolution observation that “it is a vain thing to imagine a right without
a remedy.” Ashby v. White (1703), 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136; 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953.
Chief Justice Marshall wrote: “It is a settled and invariable principle . . . that every
right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163 (paraphrasing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1765)); see also Ashby, 92 Eng. Rep. at 137 (noting
that if “the plaintiff is obstructed of his right” he “shall therefore have his action.
And it is no objection to say, that it will occasion multiplicity of actions; for if men
multiply injuries, actions must be multiplied too; for every man that is injured
ought to have his recompense”).
32. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804).
33. See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private
Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1877–79 (2010).
34. See id. at 1880.
35. See Engdahl, supra note 26, at 14; see also Pfander & Hunt, supra note 33,
at 1877–81.
36. See Little, 6 U.S. at 179.
37. Id. Indeed, because he acted outside of his authority, not even the probable cause afforded by the conduct of Flying-Fish to suspect her of being an American would excuse Captain Little from damages for having seized her. Id.; see also

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-3\DIK302.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 9

UNQUALIFIED IMMUNITY

3-MAY-22

12:34

727

Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Wise v. Withers
and again affirmed the availability of damages against a federal official who exceeded his authority.38 There, a District of Columbia justice of the peace sued a fine collector for entering his home and
seizing property in satisfaction of an order from a court-martial.39
Concluding that the justice of the peace was exempt by statute from
militia duty, the Supreme Court held that the court-martial lacked
jurisdiction and could not protect the officer who executed its order.40 Both were trespassers and liable for it.41
In 1824, Justice Story articulated the separation-of-powers justification for strict liability in The Apollon.42 There, the eponymous
ship was seized by an American customs agent.43 But when the government sought payment of a duty and forfeiture of The Apollon’s
cargo, a federal court restored the ship and cargo to her owner, who
promptly sued for damages.44 The court granted them, and the Supreme Court affirmed.45 Justice Story explained that the Court’s
sole duty was “to administer the law as it finds it.” “[T]his Court
can only look to the questions, whether the laws have been violated; and if they were, justice demands, that the injured party
should receive a suitable redress.”46 Any other considerations, like
those of policy, “belong more properly to another department of
the government.”47 Harkening back to Lord Chief Justice Holt’s assertion in Entick that carving exceptions into the law would invade
the power of Parliament,48 Justice Story explained that American
courts “must administer the laws as they exist, without straining
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (addressing a
similar capture case). In Little, Chief Justice Marshall explained that his “first bias”
was to excuse the captain from damages for policy reasons. Little, 6 U.S. at 179.
Chief Justice Marshall’s colleagues convinced him, however, that the Court could
look only to the law and whether Little violated it. Id.
38. Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331, 337 (1806).
39. Id. at 335.
40. Id. at 337.
41. Id.
42. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
43. Id. at 363.
44. Id. at 363–65.
45. Id. at 366, 380.
46. Id. at 367; see also supra note 31.
47. The Apollon, 22 U.S. at 366. In the Court’s recent decision in Tanzin v.
Tanvir, JUSTICE THOMAS echoed Justice Story’s words, rejecting the government’s
policy-based demands for immunity from damages under a federal statute:
“[T]here may be policy reasons why Congress may wish to shield Government
employees from personal liability, and Congress is free to do so[,]” but the Court is
“not at liberty to do so. . . . Our task is simply to interpret the law as an ordinary
person would.” 141 S. Ct. 486, 493 (2020).
48. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tri. 1029, 1067 (K.B.).
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them to reach public mischiefs” or else the judiciary would invade
the power of Congress.49
The Court confirmed federal-official liability yet again in
1851.50 In Mitchell v. Harmony, a merchant named Manuel Harmony sued a military officer for the seizure of property in Mexico.51
Harmony had been following the American army as it traveled
from Missouri toward Chihuahua, Mexico, when the Mexican–American war broke out.52 Harmony eventually decided to
leave the expedition, but Colonel David Mitchell, on orders, forced
Harmony to accompany the army into a warzone.53 During the Battle of Sacramento River, Harmony lost his property—the last of it
seized and confiscated by Mexican authorities.54 Harmony sued
Colonel Mitchell and received an award of damages.55 Among
other justifications, Mitchell argued that he had merely acted in
obedience to the order of his commanding officer.56 That justification, the Court held, “may be disposed of in a few words.”57 Those
49. The Apollon, 22 U.S. at 366. Justice Story also explained that the cost of
even a justified violation of the law must fall on the government, not the individual
whose rights were violated:
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the high
discretion confided to the executive, for great public purposes, to act on a
sudden emergency, or to prevent and irreparable mischief, by summary
measures, which are not found in the text of the laws. Such measures are
properly matters of state, and if the responsibility is taken under justifiable circumstances, the legislature will doubtlessly apply a proper indemnity [to the liable official].
Id. at 366–67. Under this conception of the separation of powers, an executive
branch official could act outside his legal authority in emergency circumstances,
but the victims of his actions were still entitled to a legal remedy from the official.
If the executive actions were justified, Congress addressed any policy concerns
arising out of individual liability by indemnifying the official, as it commonly did.
See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 33, at 1868–69 (“[P]erhaps as early as 1804, when
the Marshall Court decided Little and Murray, and certainly by 1836, the Supreme
Court simply assumed that indemnity was routinely available to take the sting out
of any official liability.”).
50. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 137 (1851).
51. Id. at 128.
52. Id. at 128–29.
53. Id. at 129.
54. Id. at 130.
55. Id. at 130, 132.
56. Id. at 132.
57. Id. at 137. Reinforcing the historical force of official liability, the Court
cited Lord Mansfield’s discussion of an unnamed precedent in Mostyn v. Fabrigas:
Captain Gambier, of the British navy, by the order of Admiral Boscawen, pulled down the houses of some sutlers on the coast of Nova Scotia, who were supplying the sailors with spirituous liquors, the health of
the sailors being injured by frequenting them. The motive was evidently a
laudable one, and the act done for the public service. Yet it was an invasion of the rights of private property, and without the authority of law,
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words, illustrating the centrality of remedies to the rule of law and
the judicial role,58 were: “[T]he order given was an order to do an
illegal act; to commit a trespass upon the property of another; and
can afford no justification to the person by whom it was
executed.”59
C. The creation of a federal damages action against state and
local officials did not diminish the availability of
damages against their federal counterparts.
Between 1861 and 1865, America fought a civil war. With the
Union’s victory over the Confederacy came the adoption of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.60 The Fourteenth Amendment subjected the states and their
officials to the restrictions of the Bill of Rights for the first time.61
This new amendment empowered Congress “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”62 Congress did so
by passing a statute placing state and local officials on a liability
footing much like their federal counterparts.

and the officer who executed the order was held liable to an action, and
the sutlers recovered damages against him to the value of the property
destroyed.
Id. at 135–36 (citing Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1032; 1 Cowp.
161, 180). The Court then explained that the case “shows how carefully the rights
of private property are guarded by the laws in England; and they are certainly not
less valued nor less securely guarded under the Constitution and laws of the
United States.” Id. at 136.
58. See supra note 49 (discussing Justice Story’s reliance on indemnity to address the policy implications in situations where the guilty official was following
illegal orders like those given in Little, Murray, Wise, The Apollon, and Mitchell).
59. Mitchell, 45 U.S. at 137.
60. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 37 (1872) (“[T]he main purpose of all the three last amendments was the freedom of the African race, the
security and perpetuation of that freedom, and their protection from the oppressions of the white men who had formerly held them in slavery.”).
61. “When ratified in 1791, the Bill of Rights applied only to the Federal Government . . . [T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the
protections contained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the
States.” Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.”).
62. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5.
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1. The enactment of Section 1983 opened state and local officers
to the sort of liability already available against federal
officers.
In the wake of the Civil War, the Ku Klux Klan waged a campaign of terror and deadly violence against blacks and Union sympathizers.63 On March 23, 1871, President Ulysses S. Grant sent a
message to Congress requesting legislation to stem the violence.64
Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, which included a provision now
commonly called “Section 1983” for its codification at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.65
As enacted, Section 1 of the Act created a private cause of
action against “any person who, under color of any law of any State
shall subject any person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution.”66 That provision “was
designed primarily in response to the unwillingness or inability of
the state governments to enforce their own laws against those violating the civil rights of others.”67 Section 1983 was an effort “to
afford a federal right in federal court because, by reason of
63. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1973); see also ERIC
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
425–44 (2014) (cataloguing Klan violence and formation).
64. See Carter, 409 U.S. at 426.
65. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983). Congress also created the Department of Justice in 1870 for similar reasons. See Robert K. Kaczorowski, Federal Enforcement of Civil Rights During the
First Reconstruction, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155, 157–58 (1995).
66. 17 Stat. at 13 (abridged). Unabridged, the Act provided:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected,
any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the
United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the
party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 181 n.27 (1961) (reproducing the statutory text as originally introduced). The Act’s expansive language confirmed the
Supreme Court’s consistent refusal to excuse officials for liability when following
orders, see supra Section I.B, and went a step further. The Act guaranteed that the
liability created in Section 1983 would apply “any such law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding.” Ku Klux
Klan Act at 13 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court would, nevertheless, later
create and enforce immunities based on the justification that officials were relying
on unconstitutional laws. See infra Sections II–III.B (discussing the creation and
expansion of good-faith immunity and qualified immunity), infra note 87 (specifically addressing the incompatibility of the Ku Klux Klan Act and the immunity the
Supreme Court created in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)).
67. Carter, 409 U.S. at 426.
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prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of
rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.”68 There was no
similar worry with regard to federal officials subject to claims in
state courts, where they were not met with such indulgence.69 Thus,
after Congress’s passage of Section 1983, both state and federal officials were liable for damages in both state and federal courts.70
2. The Supreme Court continued to enforce strict liability against
government officials until the middle of the 20th century.
As the Supreme Court’s 1877 decision in Bates v. Clark demonstrates, the passage of Section 1983 did not change the Court’s
approach to strict liability for federal officials. In Bates, an army
captain and his lieutenant seized whiskey from merchants in the
Dakota Territory, incorrectly believing they were in “Indian country”—where Congress had forbidden alcohol.71 Even though the officers eventually returned the whiskey, the merchants sued them
and recovered damages.72 The Dakota Territory Supreme Court approved the judgment, explaining, “[h]owever good the intentions
and purposes of the defendants . . . they committed against the
plaintiffs a willful and unlawful act from which flowed all the damages they sustained.”73 The Supreme Court affirmed. It applied a
68. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180 (discussing, also, the “long and extensive debates” over the issues in the post-war South). The problem Section 1983 aimed to
solve was partly a jurisdictional one. “At the time this Act was adopted . . . there
existed no general federal-question jurisdiction in the lower federal courts.”
Carter, 409 U.S. at 427. “During most of the Nation’s first century, Congress relied
on the state courts to vindicate essential rights arising under the Constitution and
federal laws.” Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245 (1967). On the heels of Section
1983, however, Congress invested “the federal judiciary with enormously increased
powers” through the provision of federal-question jurisdiction. Id. at 246–47 (citing
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1331)). Section 1331 gave the district courts original jurisdiction, “concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds . . . five hundred dollars, and
arising under the Constitution of the laws of the United States.” § 1, 18 Stat. at 470.
Later cases permitting direct constitutional claims against federal officials would
rely in part on this jurisdictional grant. See infra Section II.B.1; accord supra note
22.
69. See, e.g., Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380 (C.C.D. Ind. 1871) (No. 9,605).
70. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (noting that the passage
of Section 1983 was “hardly a reason for excusing their federal counterparts for the
identical constitutional transgressions”).
71. Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 204–06 (1877).
72. Id. at 209–10.
73. Clark v. Bates, 46 N.W. 510, 512 (Dakota 1874).
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similar analysis, writing that the officers “were utterly without any
authority in the premises; and their honest belief that they had is no
defense in their case more than in any other, where a party mistaking his rights commits a trespass by forcibly seizing and taking away
another man’s property.”74
Thus, throughout the 19th century, the rule in the United
States was that federal officials were strictly liable for actions taken
outside their authority.75 At bottom, “No officer of the law may set
that law at defiance with impunity. All of the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and
are bound to obey it.”76 Even Congress could not authorize unconstitutional conduct,77 and, “[s]ince an unconstitutional act, even if

74. Bates, 95 U.S. at 209.
75. See Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 452
(1883) (“To make out his defense he must show that his authority was sufficient in
law to protect him.”); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 18 (1896) (“[T]he exception
of the United States from judicial process does not protect their officers and agents
. . . from being personally liable to an action of tort by a private person whose
rights of property they have wrongfully invaded or injured, even by authority of
the United States.”); see also James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking
Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 123 n.28
(2009) (collecting cases illustrating the diverse actions available against federal
officials).
76. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882). Lee, like The Apollon and
Mitchell v. Harmony, clarified the central role judicially-applied remedies played
in ensuring the government does not trample individual rights:
Courts of justice are established, not only to decide upon the controverted rights of the citizens as against each other, but also upon rights in
controversy between them and the government, and the docket of this
court is crowded with controversies of the latter class. Shall it be said . . .
that the courts cannot give remedy when the citizen has been deprived of
his property by force . . . because the president has ordered it and his
officers are in possession? If such be the law of this country, it sanctions a
tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any
other government which has a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the
protection of personal rights.
Id. at 220–21.
77. Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 640 (1884) (“That an act passed after the
event, which, in effect, ratifies what has been done, and declares that no suit shall
be sustained against the party acting under color of authority, is valid, so far as
congress could have conferred such authority before, admits of no reasonable
doubt.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 649; 4 S. Ct. 312, 313–14 (Field, J., dissenting) (reported separately); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370, 373 (1863) (“The question here arises, then, can
Congress enact that the citizen shall have no redress for a violation of his rights,
secured to him by the . . . Constitution . . . . These sections prohibit the passage of a
law by Congress, authorizing the arrest of the citizen, without just cause, because
such arrest deprives him of his liberty.”).
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authorized by statute, was viewed as not authorized in contemplation of law, there could be no immunity defense.”78
The Supreme Court would change that.
II. IN

THE MID-20TH CENTURY, THE

COURT

CREATED LIMITED

IMMUNITIES AND CONSISTENTLY REJECTED DEMANDS
FROM FEDERAL OFFICIALS FOR ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY.

In 1967, the Supreme Court announced a general “defense of
good faith and probable cause” that shielded state and local police
from liability under Section 1983.79 The Court soon extended that
good-faith immunity to federal officials in Butz v. Economou.80 In
so doing, however, the Court rejected demands for absolute immunity from federal officials, observing the historical availability of
such damages and the absurdity of holding federal officials to a
lower standard than state officials when enforcing the federal
Constitution.81
A. In 1967, the Court announced a good-faith immunity to
constitutional claims against state officials.
The shift away from accountability began with Pierson v. Ray,
when the Court created a good-faith immunity to constitutional
claims. In Pierson, Mississippi police relying on an unconstitutional
breach-of-the-peace ordinance arrested a group of black clergymen
for their attempted use of segregated facilities at an Alabama bus
station.82 After charges against the clergymen were dropped, they
sued the officers under Section 1983.83
78. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 490–91, 491 n.15–16 (1978) (citing,
among others, Lee, 106 U.S. at 218–23; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 269,
286–92 (1885)); see also id. at 489–90 (“A federal official who acted outside of his
federal statutory authority would be held strictly liable for his trespassory acts.”).
79. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556–57 (1967). The defense announced in
Pierson has confusingly been called “qualified immunity” by the Court. See, e.g.,
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974). But Pierson never used that
phrase. Instead, it merely explained that “[t]he common law has never granted
police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity.” Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555. For
the sake of clarity, this Article calls the Pierson defense “good-faith immunity.”
Any reference to “qualified immunity” means the doctrine announced in Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), see infra Section III.A, and still in effect today.
See, e.g., City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 142 S. Ct. 9 (2021) (per curiam).
80. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 503–04.
81. See id. at 500–01.
82. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 548–49.
83. Id. at 550.
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Pointing to the elements of common-law false arrest, the Court
announced that “a peace officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the innocence
of the suspect is later proved.”84 The Court explained that a “policemen’s lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being
charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has
probable cause, and being mulcted with damages if he does.”85
From that, the Court deduced that police should be excused from
liability whenever they act with statutory justification.86 If officers
reasonably believed in good faith an arrest was constitutional, the
officers were immune from liability “even though the arrest was in

84. Id. at 555.
85. Id. In and after Pierson, the Court justified the creation and extension of
immunities as necessary to shield individual officials from financial ruin. See, e.g.,
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988). Scholarship has disproven that judicial
assumption, showing that both before and after Pierson officials held liable for
damages were commonly indemnified. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 33, at 1904–05
(finding an antebellum indemnity rate of about 60%); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 912–13 (2014) (finding that government
employers paid 99.98% of damages recovered against police). See generally James
E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of Personal
Liability, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561 (2020) (finding that in more than 95% of cases
against prison officials individual defendants contributed no personal resources to
the resolution of claims).
86. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555.
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fact unconstitutional.”87 As an affirmative defense, the burden of
establishing good-faith immunity fell to the defendant.88
B. In 1971, the Court recognized in Bivens that the Constitution
creates a direct cause of action against federal officials
but continued to expand the doctrine of good-faith
immunity for state officials.
The Court continued to grow good-faith immunity in a series
of decisions that followed Pierson. But before it did, it decided Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics
and officially recognized the existence of a cause of action against
federal officials directly under the Constitution.89 Until this point,
constitutional claims against federal officials operated indirectly,
defeating official justifications used to defend against common-law
claims in both state and federal court.90

87. Id. at 557. Pierson’s analysis is highly dubious. See Baude, supra note 6, at
51–61. Besides contravening the many decisions set forth in Section I, infra, Pierson went against the Court’s earlier decision in the strikingly similar case of Myers
v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915). There, the Supreme Court affirmed a Section
1983 judgment against Maryland election officials who prevented three black men
from voting under an unconstitutional state statute. Id. at 377, 383. The officers
argued that they should not be held liable because they believed, in good faith,
that the statute was constitutional. Anderson v. Myers, 182 F. 223, 226 (C.C.D. Md.
1910). The circuit court rejected that argument and held—channeling Chief Justice
Marshall in Little v. Barreme—that anyone enforcing an unconstitutional law
“does so at his known peril and is made liable to an action for damages.” Id. at 230;
see also Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 269, 292 (1885); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S.
204, 209 (1877).
Perhaps more consequentially, Pierson’s statutory-reliance justification contradicted the original text of Section 1983. As enacted, the act confirmed individual
liability for constitutional violations, “any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding.” Ku Klux Klan Act,
ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (emphasis added); see
also supra note 66; Patrick Jaicomo & Anya Bidwell, Recalibrating Qualified Immunity, 112 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 122 n.118 (2022) (discussing similar
issues with Pierson’s analysis). The statutory text shows that Congress intended to
abrogate defenses or immunities from other sources (including the common law),
even if they would have otherwise been folded into Section 1983 as background
law.
88. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
89. The Court suggested the availability of direct constitutional causes of action years earlier in Bell v. Hood but did not reach the issue in that case. 327 U.S.
678, 683–85 (1946).
90. See supra note 30 (illustrating the indirect process).
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1. The Court recognized the availability of a direct cause of
action against federal officials for constitutional violations.
In Bivens, narcotics agents entered Webster Bivens’s apartment without a warrant and arrested him without probable cause,
using excessive force in the process.91 The agents handcuffed Bivens in front of his family and searched his apartment before taking
him to a federal courthouse, where they interrogated, booked, and
strip-searched him.92 Bivens sued the agents for damages directly
under the Constitution, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.93
The government moved to dismiss Bivens’s claims, arguing that
his remedy was in state court through the indirect process described
above: Bivens could sue in tort under state law; the agents could
defend by asserting that their actions were a valid use of federal
power; but if the agents were shown to have violated the Fourth
Amendment, that defense would be lost “and they would stand
before the state law merely as private individuals.”94 The Supreme
Court rejected the idea that state-law remedies were sufficient in
Bivens’s case, explaining that federal authority, when wielded in violation of the Constitution, “possesses a far greater capacity for
harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other
than his own.”95
The Court held that a constitutional remedy was needed.96 Although the Bill of Rights did not affirmatively provide for its enforcement through damages, the Court explained that the
availability of a damages remedy should not be surprising because
“[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy
91. Bivens v. Six Uknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 388–89.
94. Id. at 390–91. Although the government argued in Bivens that state law
provided a “remedy for an unconstitutional invasion of . . . rights by federal
agents,” id. at 390, Congress would later prohibit state claims against federal officers through the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679; see also infra notes 205–06.
95. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392. The Court added that relegating constitutional
claims to state tort law would effectively subject the Constitution to the state policy considerations underlying the decision to “prohibit or penalize the identical act
if engaged in by a private person.” Id. at 392–95; see also id. at 395 n.8 (noting that
although no state prohibited the use of reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest
by a private person, two states had outlawed resistance to an unlawful arrest by
government officers). Concurring Justice Harlan added, “[T]here is very little to be
gained from the standpoint of federalism by preserving different rules of liability
for federal officers dependent on the State where the injury occurs.” Id. at 409
(Harlan, J., concurring).
96. See id. at 393–94.
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for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.”97 After all, the
Court had long held that every right must have a corresponding
remedy,98 and for people like Bivens, that remedy “is damages or
nothing.”99
2. Concurrently, the Court continued to develop the doctrine of
good-faith immunity for state officials.
Although it implicitly rejected absolute immunity for federal
officials, Bivens did not directly address whether federal officials
were entitled to some other form of immunity.100 The Court separately continued to develop good-faith immunity for state officials.
In its 1974 decision in Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Court extended
Pierson’s good-faith immunity to the Governor of Ohio and other
state officials to shield them from claims arising from the Kent
State Massacre.101 The Court, citing policy concerns that historically
influenced common-law immunity doctrines, homed in on one in
particular—that “the public interest requires decisions and action
to enforce laws for the protection of the public.”102 Rejecting the
97. See id. at 395–96 (citations omitted). As Bell v. Hood had explained 25
years earlier, it was “well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Id. at 396 (citing
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). In Bivens (and Bell and cases like them)
that statute was the federal-question-jurisdiction statute, Section 1331, through
which Congress provided the courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 398–99 (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Bell, 327 U.S. at 680 (citing the statute as previously codified at 28
U.S.C. § 41(1)). Justice Harlan explained, if federal question jurisdiction is “adequate to empower a federal court to grant equitable relief for all areas of subjectmatter . . . the same statute is sufficient to employer a federal court to grant a
traditional remedy at law.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Vladeck, supra note 6, at 1883.
98. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
163 (1803)); see also supra note 31 (discussing the pre-Revolution English origins
of this axiom and its immigration to the United States).
99. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409–10 (Harlan, J., concurring). As Justice Harlan
pointed out, neither injunctive relief (halting ongoing or prohibiting future violations) nor the exclusionary rule (excluding unconstitutionally gathered evidence
from criminal proceedings) could provide any remedy to people like Bivens, who
were neither subject to ongoing constitutional violations nor criminally tried. Id;
see also James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown-Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 13–17 (Nw. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 189, 2009)
(discussing the competing narratives related to Bivens’s innocence—or guilt—and
how they have influenced the understanding of the Bivens doctrine).
100. But see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505 (1978) (equating absolute
immunity and the absence of a cause of action).
101. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 233–34 (1974).
102. Id. at 240–42. But see id. at 246 (justifying some amount of immunity
because “officials with a broad range of duties and authority must often act swiftly
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officials’ calls for absolute immunity (a common theme in the
Court’s decisions extending lesser immunities as an apparent compromise solution103), the Court expanded good-faith immunity. Observing that, while police are entitled to a defense of good faith and
probable cause,104 the Court extended Pierson to protect officials
who acted in good faith and “within the range of discretion permitted the holders of such office under [state] law.”105
In 1975, the Court extended good-faith immunity to school officials in Wood v. Strickland.106 The Court again cited “public-policy
reasons,” adding this time to its growing list of concern that, without some form of immunity, candidates for school board might be
deterred from seeking office.107 Wood again changed the standard,
even if slightly, providing immunity for actions taken “in the goodfaith fulfillment of . . . responsibilities . . . within the bounds of
reason under all the circumstances.”108 Wood clarified that this
standard contained both subjective (“good faith”) and objective
(“reasonableness”) elements.109 Thus, damages were appropriate if
school officials acted maliciously or with “disregard of the student’s
clearly established constitutional rights.”110 But, the Court exand firmly at the risk that action deferred will be futile or constitute virtual abdication of office”). Scheuer contradicted The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 366–67
(1824), in which the Court had expressly rejected that justification 150 years earlier. See also supra note 49.
103. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808 (1982); Butz, 438 U.S. at
485; Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 320 (1975); Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 238–39. Along with the Court’s consistent reliance on policy to extend immunity to more and more types of government
officials, the Court was either acting as a common-law court, contra Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), or as an activist Court, invading the legislative
role, contra, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. at 366–67. See also Jaicomo & Bidwell,
supra note 87, at 110, 115–18 (explaining that the historical judicial role was focused exclusively on the law, and if it was violated, applying an appropriate remedy, while the historical legislative role focused on policy and adjusting incentives
through indemnification); Vladeck, supra note 6, at 1887.
104. Scheur, 416 U.S. at 246.
105. Id. at 251.
106. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
107. Id. at 316–20.
108. Id. at 321.
109. Id. at 321–22; see also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975)
(providing a good-faith immunity to a hospital superintended who kept a patient
committed against his will and without justification).
110. Wood, 420 U.S. at 322. Justice Powell objected to the reliance on “clearly
established” law, arguing that “[t]his harsh standard, requiring knowledge of what
is characterized as ‘settled, indisputable law,’ leaves little substance to the doctrine
of qualified immunity. The Court’s decision appears to rest on an unwarranted
assumption as to what lay school officials know or can know about the law and
constitutional rights.” Id. at 329 (Powell, J., dissenting in part). But see infra note
159. Justice Powell was correct in Wood that the Court’s assumption was unwar-
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plained, any “lesser standard” would prevent the vindication of
constitutional rights.111
In 1978, the Court finally extended good-faith immunity to all
state and local officials sued under Section 1983.112 In Procunier v.
Navarette, a California prison inmate sued his jailers for interfering
with his mail.113 Surveying its opinions as well as those of the circuit
and district courts, the Court determined that none of them “clearly
established” that the officials had violated the Constitution.114 And
because the claims merely alleged negligence, there was no malicious intent.115 Accordingly, the officials were immune.
C. In 1978, the Court extended good-faith immunity to federal
officials in Butz, citing the importance of treating state
and federal officials equally under the Constitution.
Balancing good-faith immunity against the need for federal accountability, the Supreme Court decided Butz v. Economou in
1978.116 Although Butz extended good-faith immunity to federal officials, it—much more so than Bivens—was a monument to the importance of federal accountability and the constitutional need to
ensure that all rights are enforceable under the law, even if, perhaps
especially if, violated by federal officials.
In Butz, business owner Earl Butz sued several Department of
Agriculture officials, including the Secretary of Agriculture, a member of the cabinet, alleging that they investigated and proceeded
against him in retaliation for his criticism of the agency.117 The government took the position that federal officials were absolutely imranted. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Boldest Lie, 88 U.
CHI. L. REV. 605 (2021) (proving that government officials are not aware of the
facts or holdings of specific court opinions that clearly establish the law).
111. Id. at 322.
112. See generally Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). Dissenting Justice Stevens explained that Procunier “strongly implies that every defendant in a
§ 1983 action is entitled to assert a qualified immunity from damage liability.” Id.
at 568 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Up to that point, “[a]s the immunity doctrine developed, the Court was careful to limit its holdings to specific officials, and to insist
that a considered inquiry into the common law was an essential precondition to the
recognition of the proper immunity for any official,” Justice Stevens explained,
Procunier abandoned those limits. Id. at 568–69 (citing Wood, 420 U.S at 322; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S 409, 421 (1976) (announcing absolute immunity for
prosecutors)).
113. Id. at 556–57.
114. Id. at 565.
115. Id. at 566 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 8A, 282, 282
cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1965)).
116. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
117. Id. at 480.
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mune from liability even if they violated the Constitution “and even
if the violation was knowing and deliberate.”118 The Supreme
Court, however, was “quite sure that was unsound and consequently rejected it.”119
Instead, Butz turned to “the general rule, which long prevailed,
that a federal official may not with impunity ignore the limitations
which the controlling law has placed on his powers.”120 Citing many
of the cases discussed in Section I. B–C, the Court explained that “a
federal official was protected for action tortious under state law
only if his acts were authorized by controlling federal law.”121
“Since an unconstitutional act, even if authorized by statute, was
viewed as not authorized in contemplation of law, there could be no
immunity defense.”122 Strangely, Butz would permit one anyhow.123
118. Id. at 486. For this proposition, the government relied on a plurality
opinion in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 564 (1959), where an agency director had
been sued for malicious defamation by two employees whose suspensions for misconduct he announced in a press release. Because the director had acted within his
lawfully conferred discretion, the plurality found that the director was entitled to
“absolute privilege.” Id. at 569–74. Even so, “Barr did not purport to protect an
official who has . . . violated those fundamental principles of fairness embodied in
the Constitution.” Butz, 438 U.S. at 495; see also infra note 122.
119. Butz, 438 U.S. at 485 (cleaned up).
120. Id. at 489.
121. Id. at 490.
122. Id. at 489–91 (citing, among others, Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
170 (1804); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S.
204 (1877); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)). Butz also distinguished
those cases from others where the Court had granted immunity because the subject federal officials had acted within their lawful zones of discretion. Id. at 491–95
(citing Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845); Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 89 (1849); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896)). For demonstration,
Butz noted that the defendant in Kendall had acted through his “normal duties . . .
in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon him”; the defendant in Wilkes had
not “exceeded his jurisdiction”; and the defendant in Spalding “did not exceed his
authority, nor pass the line of his duty.” Id. at 491–95 (citations omitted); see also
id. at 489 (“Barr does not control this case” because “[i]t did not address the liability of the acting director had his conduct not been within the outer limits of his
duties.”). Butz explained that none of those cases “purporte[d] to immunize officials who ignore limitations on their authority imposed by law.” Id. at 494. And,
Butz noted, since federal officials “are accountable when they stray beyond the
plain limits of their statutory authority, it would be incongruous to hold that they
may nevertheless . . . violate constitutional rights without fear of liability.” Id. at
495. Because, of course, an unconstitutional act is necessarily one beyond the limits
of any lawful authority. Id. at 490–91.
Recent attempts to rehabilitate Pierson’s good-faith immunity have cited
Kendall, Wilkes, and Spalding for the proposition that at common law “at least
qualified immunity applie[d] to executive officials’ discretionary acts.” Scott A.
Keller, Qualified and Absolute Immunity at Common Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1337,
1360–64, 1383–84 (2021). But those arguments overlook the distinction between
discretionary acts done with authority—for which immunity was provided, as in
Kendall v. Stokes—and acts done without it, like those that violate the Constitu-
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Surveying Pierson and its progeny, Butz extended good-faith
immunity to federal officials.124 Still, the Court went to great
lengths to explain that “there is no basis for according to federal
officials a higher degree of immunity from liability when sued for a
constitutional infringement . . . than is accorded state officials when
sued for the identical violation.”125
To bolster the availability of constitutional claims against federal officials, while still providing them good-faith immunity, the
Court’s analysis centered on similarity between state and federal
officials.126 The Court reasoned that constitutional injuries suffered
at the hands of federal officials were at least as damaging as those
suffered at the hands of state officials (if not more so) and that the
two groups faced the same pressures and uncertainty. The Court,
therefore, saw “no sense in holding a state governor liable [in
Scheuer] but immunizing the head of a federal department [in
Butz].”127 It would be untenable, the Court reasoned, to distinguish
between state and federal officials when applying constitutional
remedies or immunities.128
D. In 1979, the Court confirmed the general availability of
constitutional claims against federal officials.
In Butz, the Court equated Bivens with a rejection of absolute
immunity for federal officials129 and a recognition of the general
tion—for which officers were held strictly liable, as in Little v. Barreme. Butz, 438
U.S. at 489–95. See generally James E. Pfander, Zones of Discretion at Common
Law, 116 NW. L. REV. Online 148 (2021) (responding to Keller); William Baude, Is
Quasi-Judicial Immunity Qualified Immunity?, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022) (responding to Keller).
123. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 507 n.34. (“Although, as [Bivens] makes clear,
traditional doctrine did not accord immunity to officials who transgressed constitutional limits, we believe that federal officials sued by such traditional means should
similarly be entitled to a [good-faith] immunity.”). And as in all other cases in the
Pierson line, Butz relied on policy to justify its departure from legal history. Id. at
503 (weighing the “plaintiff’s right to compensation” against “the need to protect
the decisionmaking processes of the executive department”).
124. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 496–501.
125. Id. at 500.
126. See id. at 504.
127. Id. at 500–01.
128. Id. at 500, 504.
129. Id. at 501 (“[T]he cause of action recognized in Bivens would . . . be
drained of meaning if federal officials were entitled to absolute immunity for their
constitutional transgressions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 505 (“If
. . . all [federal] officials . . . were exempt from personal liability, a suit under the
Constitution could provide no redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in any
degree deter federal officials from committing constitutional wrongs.”). This general liability scheme was subject only to a small number of absolute immunities the
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availability of constitutional claims against them.130 The Court confirmed that understanding in two cases following shortly after: Davis v. Passman131 and Carlson v. Green.132
In 1979, Davis approved Fifth Amendment due process claims
against Congressman Otto Passman for his discriminatory firing of
a staffer because she was a woman.133 Davis began from the “well
settled” proposition that where legal rights are invaded, “courts
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”134
The Court held that damages were, therefore, available against federal officials unless there were “special factors counseling hesitation
in the absence of affirmative action by Congress” or an “explicit
congressional declaration that persons in petitioner’s position” injured by unconstitutional acts “may not recover money damages
from those responsible for the injury.”135 Both exceptions were narrow. The Court found no “special factors” in Davis because, although a suit against a congressman “does raise special concerns
counseling hesitation,” legislative immunity offsets them.136 And
there was no explicit statutory prohibition against suing members of
Congress for damages.137
A year later, Carlson similarly approved Eighth Amendment
claims against prison officials for their failure to provide adequate
medical care.138 Carlson also confirmed that Bivens had broadly
“established that the victims of a constitutional violation by a fedCourt had approved for their ostensibly historical availability (e.g., judicial and
prosecutorial immunities). Id. at 508–17.
130. Id. at 504. Indeed, Butz itself approved claims against, among other federal officials, the Secretary of Agriculture for First Amendment retaliation—a far
cry from the particulars of Bivens. Id. at 480, 483, 517. So too were the many other
contexts in which the Court has implied or permitted claims against federal officials. See infra Appendix A (collecting Supreme Court decisions recognizing, implying, or allowing constitutional claims against federal officials to proceed).
131. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979) (“Last Term, Butz reaffirmed
[Bivens], stating that the decision in Bivens established that a citizen suffering a
compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest could . . . obtain an
award of monetary damages against the responsible federal officer.”) (citing Butz,
438 U.S. at 504) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (“Bivens established that the
victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court . . . .”).
133. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 230–31.
134. Id. at 245 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
135. Id. at 245–48 (emphasis in original) (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 504; and
then citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)). But see supra note 77 (citing cases noting that Congress
cannot authorize unconstitutional acts).
136. Id. at 246.
137. Id. at 246–47.
138. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16–18 (1980).
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eral agent have a right to recover damages.”139 But Carlson slightly
changed the narrow exceptions through which federal defendants
could defeat Bivens. Defendants had to show either (1), as in Davis,
“special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative
action by Congress,” or (2), slightly different from Davis, that Congress provided an alternative remedy explicitly declared to be an
equally effective substitute for Bivens.140 Carlson confirmed a strict
understanding of this two-part test, rejecting both exceptions. Like
Davis, the Court held that the availability of immunity precluded
any special factors that may otherwise exist.141 And, although Congress had provided a wide-ranging cause of action for torts committed by federal employees, Congress did not explicitly declare it was
intended to replace Bivens.142
Through Davis and Carlson, the Court confirmed the general
availability of constitutional claims against federal officials without
regard to context. Bivens thus entered the 1980s limited only by two
very narrow exceptions.

139. Id. at 18.
140. Id. at 18–19 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97; and then citing Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245–47 (1979)). This Article collectively refers to both elements as the “special-factors test.”
141. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 246; and then citing
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)). While Davis relied on legislative immunity, Carlson relied on good-faith immunity. Davis, 442 U.S. at 230, 232; Carlson,
446 U.S. at 21.
142. Congress provided a statutory action through the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80 (making the United States vicariously liable for certain torts committed by its employees, subject to a variety of
exceptions and restrictions). Carlson held, however, that the FTCA does not preempt Bivens. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19–23. To the contrary, Carlson noted Congress
has made it “crystal clear” through its 1974 amendment of the FTCA that the Act
and Bivens are “parallel, complementary causes of action.” Id. (quoting S. REP.
NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973) (indicating that the FTCA “should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its progen[y]”) (emphasis added)).
Although the Court has never addressed the issue directly, Carlson’s observation that Congress statutorily confirmed Bivens through the FTCA appears to be
“affirmative action by Congress” that should logically defeat Carlson’s first exception in nearly every (if not in every) Bivens case. Put differently, if a defendant is
merely permitted to offer “special factors” absent affirmative action by Congress,
and the FTCA constitutes affirmative action by Congress, there should be almost
no situation in which special factors can override that Congressional action (short
of a more specific Congressional enactment). See also notes 205–06 infra (discussing additional affirmative action by Congress approving Bivens).
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CREATED AND EXPANDED QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY TO ADDRESS ITS POLICY CONCERNS WITH A
BROAD UNDERSTANDING OF

BIVENS CLAIMS,
BIVENS

WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY CABINING
TO ITS PRECISE FACTS.

Building on Bivens, Butz, Davis, and Carlson, the Court in
1982 again rejected claims for absolute immunity from federal officials in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.143 Instead, to assuage the Court’s policy concerns about holding federal officials liable for damages,
Harlow crafted a new form of immunity called “qualified immunity.” Divorced from the common-law justifications of Pierson’s
good-faith immunity, qualified immunity removed good faith from
the equation and provided a more potent form of immunity for all
government officials—federal, state, and local.
Despite the Court’s reliance on the general availability of Bivens claims as the reason to create qualified immunity and then expand the doctrine over the next four decades, the Court
simultaneously cabined Bivens to its particular facts. Today, the
Court provides federal officials with a de facto absolute federal immunity in all but a vanishingly small number of contexts.
A. In 1982, the broad availability of constitutional claims against
federal officials was so well established that the Court
created qualified immunity to limit perceived policy
concerns with federal liability.
As in Butz, the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald confronted First Amendment retaliation claims against high-level federal officials and their demand for absolute immunity.144 And like it
had in Butz, the Court permitted those claims to move forward,
subject to a lesser immunity. But Harlow demolished the good-faith
immunity Butz applied to federal officials.145 In its place, the Court
erected the doctrine of qualified immunity still in effect today.146
In Harlow, two White House aides to President Richard
Nixon—Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield—were accused
of conspiring to have Air Force management analyst A. Ernest Fitzgerald fired.147 Upset that Fitzgerald had blown the whistle to Con143. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
144. See id. at 800.
145. See id. at 815–18.
146. Id. at 809, 818.
147. Id. at 802–805. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, Fitzgerald sued former President
Nixon for his part in the alleged conspiracy. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,
733–739 (1982). There, the Court provided absolute immunity because “[t]he Pres-
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gress about the Air Force’s shoddy purchasing practices, the Nixon
Administration ordered a departmental reorganization and reduction in force through which Fitzgerald’s job was eliminated.148
Ignoring the historical line of cases cited in Butz to hold accountable federal officials who strayed beyond their legal authority,
the Court started from the premise that it had “consistently held
that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity
from suit for damages.”149 Between absolute and qualified immunity, Harlow explained that “qualified immunity represents the
norm.”150 So Harlow rejected the defendants’ request for absolute
immunity.151 The Court wrote that damages against federal officials
are an important mechanism to vindicate the Constitution, especially because “the greater power of high officials . . . affords a
greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct.”152
The Court’s analysis, again, rested on policy—not law.153 The
Court noted its concern that liability against the federal defendants
in Harlow, and those like them, would carry “social costs” because
litigating constitutional violations is costly, requires attention, may
deter some from accepting office, and could create apprehension
that would “dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the
most irresponsible.”154 Some form of immunity, Harlow determined, would best accommodate the competing values of “protect[ing] the rights of citizens” and shielding federal officials from
“insubstantial lawsuits.”155 To balance those concerns, Harlow concluded that good-faith immunity “require[d] an adjustment”—and
so, qualified immunity was born.156
ident’s unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him from other officials.” Id. at 750.
148. See id. at 733–34, 756.
149. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806 (citing Nixon, 457 U.S. at 731).
150. Id. at 807.
151. Id. at 808–09.
152. Id. at 809 (cleaned up).
153. See id. at 813 (“The resolution of immunity questions requires a balance
between the evils inevitable in any available alternative.”); see also, e.g., id. (finding that the defendants had not shown that “public policy requires” their entitlement to absolute immunity but crediting their argument that “public policy at least
mandates an application of . . . qualified immunity”); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523
U.S. 574, 594 n.15 (1998) (“Harlow was forthright in revising the immunity defense
for policy reasons . . . .”).
154. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814, 814 n.22 (citing Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our
Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages,
1980 S. CT. REV. 281, 324–27 (1980); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d. Cir.
1949)).
155. Id. at 807, 813–15.
156. Id. at 815.
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Harlow reiterated that good-faith immunity had both an objective element and a subjective element.157 The Court concluded that
adjudicating the subjective element (i.e., good faith) was too costly
because it required factfinding: discovery and trials.158 Harlow,
therefore, struck good faith from the immunity calculus and transformed it into qualified immunity, where “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”159 This species of immunity had no basis in common law. It was instead a pure manifestation of the
Court’s policy preferences.160
Although the availability of Bivens was not directly before the
Court,161 Harlow explained that if a claim could clear the immunity
bar, “a person who suffers injury caused by such conduct may have
a cause of action.”162 More importantly, just as Butz explained that
157. Id.
158. Id. at 816–17 (“Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may
entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an
official’s professional colleagues, [which can be] disruptive of effective
government.”).
159. Id. at 818. Harlow’s exclusive reliance on “clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights” is perplexing because Justice Powell, who authored
Harlow, had just seven years earlier objected to that standard as a requirement for
immunity in Wood v. Strickland. Wood v Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 328 (1975)
(Powell, J., dissenting in part). Dissenting in Wood, Justice Powell argued that the
reliance on “clearly established” law “rest[ed] on an unwarranted assumption as to
what lay . . . officials know or can know about the law and constitutional rights.”
Id. at 328–29. He was correct. See supra note 110. Yet, less than a decade later, he
would make it the law, writing for the majority in Harlow and creating the clearly
established test that still defines qualified immunity today.
160. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) (explaining that
Harlow “completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all
embodied in the common law”). Though a comprehensive critique of qualified immunity goes beyond the scope of this Article, legal scholars and jurists have consistently criticized its lack of foundation in history, law, or empirical reality. See
generally, e.g., Baude, supra note 6, at 55–61; Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case
Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1801–20 (2018); Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862–65 (2020) (mem.) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (per curiam)
(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Ginsburg); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.
Ct. 1843, 1871–72 (THOMAS, J., concurring); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by JUSTICE THOMAS); Wyatt v. Cole, 504
U.S. 158, 170–171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Scalia); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall).
161. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 805 n.10, 820 n.36.
162. Id. at 819. From context, the Court’s use of “may” expressed permission,
not possibility. This analysis tracks Davis’s and Carlson’s use of immunity defenses
to preclude “special factors” from defeating Bivens. See supra note 141.
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Bivens’s approval of a constitutional cause of action against federal
officials could not have contemplated absolute immunity for those
same officials,163 Harlow could not have contemplated the absence
of a cause of action against federal officials. Indeed, the Court
found it necessary to create a new form of immunity to tamp down
Bivens’s perceived policy effects. But for the clear and broad availability of Bivens, Harlow’s creation of qualified immunity would be
absurd.
This observation is critical to understanding the relationship
between immunity and Bivens claims. Although the Court has explicitly confirmed Bivens only in a handful of cases, it erected an
entirely new immunity scheme premised on the understanding that
Bivens permits a broad cause of action against federal officials. Relatedly, the Court has consistently permitted Bivens claims to proceed or otherwise acknowledged them in dozens of cases,164
effectively applying a broad understanding of the constitutional
remedy announced in Bivens and confirmed in Butz.165
B. Over the past four decades, the Court has repeatedly used
Bivens to strengthen qualified immunity.
Following Harlow, federal officials were personally liable for
constitutional violations, so long as the rights they violated were
163. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504–05 (1978) (“Our opinion in
Bivens put aside the immunity question; but we could not have contemplated that
immunity would be absolute.”).
164. See infra Appendix A (listing 31 cases).
165. Relatedly, the Court has indicated in additional ways that qualified-immunity Bivens cases reflect the availability of Bivens claims, even if Bivens is not
directly addressed. First, the Court has held that the elements of Bivens are so
intertwined with qualified immunity that Bivens claims share in the procedural
benefit of immediate appealability the Court has provided for qualified immunity.
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985); Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S.
250, 257 n.5 (2006); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549 n.4 (2007). Second, the
Court has explained the Bivens issue is “antecedent” to any other issue and courts
may address Bivens even when it is not directly presented. Compare, e.g., Petition
for Certiorari, Hernandez v. Mesa, 2015 WL 4537883, at *i (S. Ct. July 23, 2015)
(No. 15-118) (presenting questions about qualified immunity and constitutional
merits), with Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006–07 (2017) (per curiam)
(remanding the case for consideration of the “antecedent” Bivens question). See
also, e.g., Liff v. Office of Inspector Gen., 881 F.3d 912, 917 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“Because the defense of qualified immunity from a Bivens damages action directly
implicates the antecedent question whether to recognize that Bivens action at all,
that question is appropriate for interlocutory appeal.”) (cleaned up); Oliva v.
Nivar, 973 F.3d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 2020) (“In cases like this one, the Supreme Court
has said the Bivens question is antecedent to questions of qualified immunity.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see infra notes 172–76 (discussing the interlocutory appeals issue).
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“clearly established.”166 In announcing that anodyne-sounding standard, Harlow assured that qualified immunity provided “no license
to lawless conduct.”167 But actions speak louder than words.168 The
Court has been prolific in its consideration of qualified immunity
over the past 40 years, deciding 36 cases applying the clearly established test.169 And the Court’s application of qualified immunity has
almost always favored immunity over accountability, rejecting immunity on just three occasions.170
The Court has also continuously modified qualified immunity,
often relying on Bivens cases, to raise the hurdle higher and higher
for civil rights plaintiffs in several key ways.
First, following the cue from Butz that it would be illogical to
distinguish between state and federal officials, the Court in Davis v.
Scherer formally extended qualified immunity to state and local officials.171 The Court thereby ensured that all government officials
would have default immunity from constitutional liability.
166. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow, 457
U.S. at 818).
167. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
168. See, e.g., Sampson v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 1012, 1025 (9th Cir.
2020) (granting qualified immunity to a social worker who sexually harassed a
woman seeking guardianship); Jessop v. City of Fresno, 936 F.3d 937, 939–40, 942
(9th Cir. 2019) (granting qualified immunity to police accused of stealing $225,000
while executing a search warrant). Although Jessop recognized that “virtually
every human society teaches that theft generally is morally wrong,” it explained
that axiom had no bearing to the qualified immunity analysis, Jessop, 936 F.3d at
941 n.1, and declined to clearly establish the unconstitutionality of the officers’
actions for future cases, id. at 940.
169. See infra Appendix B (showing that the Court has averaged nearly one
qualified immunity decision per term since Harlow was decided and more than two
per term over the past decade). This list excludes cases involving qualified immunity that were decided on grounds not related to the application of the clearly
established test. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton 523 U.S. 574, 595–97 (1998) (rejecting a heightened pleading standard for plaintiffs in qualified immunity cases);
Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561, 2563 (2018) (per curiam) (reversing a grant of
qualified immunity due to the lower court’s failure to properly apply summary
judgment standards).
170. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551
(2004); Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020).
171. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n.12 (1984). Before Davis, the Supreme Court strongly insinuated that qualified immunity would apply to state officials by granting, vacating, and reversing pending cases in light of Harlow and
citing Butz for the proposition that it was “untenable to draw a distinction for
purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials” and suits
brought against federal officials. Sanborn v. Wolfel, 458 U.S. 1102, 1102 (1982)
(mem.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And lower courts were
already applying qualified immunity to state officials before Davis. See, e.g., Trejo
v. Perez, 693 F.2d 482, 484 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982); Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270, 272
(6th Cir. 1982). Still, the Court felt it necessary to continue reinforcing that, while
Harlow created qualified immunity to shield federal officials, the doctrine also
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Second, in Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Court used Bivens claims
against the Attorney General to establish that denials of qualified
immunity are immediately appealable.172 Noting that Harlow created “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” the Court concluded that the policy benefits of qualified
immunity—that is, sparing government officials the costs of discovery and trial—would be “lost if a case is erroneously permitted to
go to trial.”173 So the Court announced that government officials
could immediately appeal denials of qualified immunity.174 The
Court later explained that government defendants had a right to
appeal at multiple stages of litigation.175 This procedural benefit
provided government defendants a “potent weapon to use against
plaintiffs” that imposed “enormous costs on [them] and on the judicial system as a whole.”176
Third, and most consequentially, the Court continuously restricted the meaning of “clearly established” law. Here, it again relied on Bivens. Beginning with Bivens claims against FBI agents in
Anderson v. Creighton, the Court held that law could not be clearly
established at a high level of generality.177 Courts could not rely on
“general rights” (e.g., the right to be free from warrantless
shielded their state and local equivalents. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340
n.2 (1986).
172. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985).
173. Id. at 526 (emphasis omitted).
174. More precisely, the Court held that a denial of qualified immunity was
subject to the “collateral order doctrine” announced in Cohen v. Benefit Industrial
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Mitchell, 472 U.S at 524–25. See generally
Michael E. Solimine, Are Interlocutory Qualified Immunity Appeals Lawful?, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 169 (2019). For purporting to divine an elaborate
three-part test from the spare language in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 granting jurisdiction of
“appeal[s] only from all final decisions of the district courts,” Cohen, 337 U.S. at
545–47, the collateral order doctrine itself “is probably the most maligned rule of
federal appellate jurisdiction,” Bryan Lammon, Finality, Appealability, and the
Scope of Interlocutory Review, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1809, 1842 n.180 (2018) (citation
omitted). Added to the fact that the Court has since conceded that treating qualified immunity denials as immediately appealable final decisions “may have expanded beyond . . . the strict application of the criteria set out in Cohen,” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009), the enormous appellate advantage Mitchell provides government defendants is built on sand.
175. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 310–11 (1996) (rejecting the circuitcourt-created limitation of defendants to a single interlocutory appeal in qualified
immunity cases).
176. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 555 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Solimine, supra note 174, at 175. The right to immediate appeal is
not guaranteed, however, if Section 1983 claims are brought in state court. In such
cases, the availability of appeal is determined by the procedures of the relevant
state. See Johnson v. Frankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997).
177. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–41 (1987).
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searches) but needed to undertake a “more particularized” consideration of “the information possessed by the . . . officials” through
the lens of the “objective (albeit fact-specific) question of whether a
reasonable officer could have believed [the specific actions] to be
lawful.”178 To be clearly established, a right had to be “sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates” it.179
The Court, in a Bivens case against the Attorney General, further impressed that to satisfy the clearly established test the law
needed to be so clear that “every” reasonable official would have to
have understood his “particular conduct” was unconstitutional.180
In another Bivens case, this time against federal marshals, the Court
explained that only “controlling authority in the [relevant] jurisdiction at the time in question which clearly established the rule”
under similar circumstances or “a consensus of cases of persuasive
authority” could clearly establish the law.181 And in a Bivens case
against Secret Service agents, the Court explained that “existing
precedent must have placed the constitutional question beyond
debate.”182
Aside from strengthening the “exacting standard” of the
clearly established test,183 the Court routinely reversed lower court
decisions on a summary basis,184 often correcting errors that would
178. Id. at 639–41.
179. Id. at 640.
180. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011); see also Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, at 201 (2001) (overruled on other grounds).
181. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (noting that unpublished cases
were insufficient). The Court has also repeatedly implied (without ever holding)
that its own precedent—not that of the circuits—may be the only source of clearly
established law. On at least six occasions, the Court has merely “[a]ssum[ed] arguendo that controlling Court of Appeals’ authority could be a dispositive source of
clearly established law.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 (2012); Taylor v.
Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 826 (2015); Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 17 (2014); City &
Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 614 (2015); City of Escondido v.
Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019); Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7
(2021). But see, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997) (“[I]n applying the rule of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens . . . we have
referred to decisions of the Courts of Appeals when enquiring whether a right was
‘clearly established.’ ”).
182. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741); see also, e.g.,
Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808, 810 (1999) (relying on Wilson, 526 U.S. 603 for a
grant of immunity); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (holding that
conflicting caselaw proves a right is not clearly established); Redding v. Safford
Unified Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. 364, 378–79 (2009) (same conclusion).
183. Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 611.
184. See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (“In the last five years,
this Court has issued a number of opinions reversing federal courts in qualified
immunity cases.”). Although the Court’s summary decision process is typically re-
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not otherwise satisfy the Court’s own rules for granting certiorari.185 Today, “[t]he pages of the United States Reports teem with
warnings about the difficulty of placing a question beyond debate”
under the clearly established test.186
Fourth, the Court in Pearson v. Callahan held that courts considering qualified immunity could skip over the constitutional merits and decide the issue exclusively on the basis that the violations
alleged were not clearly established.187 As a result, courts often
grant qualified immunity because there is no earlier case addressing
materially similar claims while never establishing law for future
cases.188 The result is a lack of precedent, which yields a lack of
clearly established law, which yields a lack of precedent, etc.—“An
Escherian Stairwell. Heads the government wins, tails plaintiff
loses.”189 Like qualified immunity itself, the Court adopted this rule
served for the rare instances when the lower court is obviously wrong, the Court
has regularly decided qualified immunity cases through summary disposition. See
Baude, supra note 6, at 84–87. Indeed, eight of the Court’s last ten qualified immunity decisions have been summary, per curiam opinions, and all but one, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017), was decided without oral argument or
merits briefing. See infra Appendix B.
185. See, e.g., Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 661 (2014) (per curiam) (ALITO,
J., concurring) (citing SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely
granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”); STEPHEN SHAPIRO, KENNETH GELLER, TIMOTHY BISHOP, EDWARD HARTNETT & DAN HIMMELFARB, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE § 5.12(c)(3) (10th ed. 2013) (“[E]rror correction . . . is outside
the mainstream of the Court’s functions and . . . not among the ‘compelling reasons’ . . . that govern the grant of certiorari.”)). The Court has taken this aggressive
approach because, in its view, qualified immunity is so important “to society as a
whole . . . the Court often corrects lower courts when they wrongly” deny immunity. Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 611 n.3 (citations omitted).
186. Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019).
187. See Pearson v. Callahan 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The Supreme Court
itself has skipped the constitutional merits in a two-thirds of its decisions granting
qualified immunity. See infra Appendix B.
188. See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (2015) (“[M]any rights potentially might never be
clearly established should a court ‘skip ahead to the question whether the law
clearly established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of
the case.’ The danger, in short, is one of ‘constitutional stagnation.’ ”) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Camreta v. Greene 563 U.S. 692,
706 (2011) (discussing how qualified immunity frustrates the development of constitutional precedent and facilitates lawlessness by officials). Id.
189. Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479–80 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The Ninth Circuit cases cited supra note 168
illustrate the judicial grace that pervades the application of the clearly established
test. Compare Sampson v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 947 F.3d 1012, 1025 (9th Cir.
2020) (clearly establishing for future cases that social workers cannot sexually harass women seeking guardianship), with Jessop v. City of Fresno, 936 F.3d 937, 940
(9th Cir 2019) (declining to clearly establish for future cases that police cannot
steal from property owners while executing search warrants).
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for policy reasons: “The procedure [of adjudicating constitutional
merits] sometimes results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case.”190 And the Court later warned in a Bivens case
that courts “should think carefully before” considering both steps
of the qualified immunity test.191
Fifth, the Court stealthily shifted the burden of overcoming the
clearly established test from defendants to plaintiffs.192 Unlike most
defenses, all a defendant need do is raise qualified immunity. Then,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove the relevant law was
clearly established.193
Among the many cases the Court used to strengthen qualified
immunity,194 it did not distinguish between federal and state officials. Instead, the Court treated the two groups “identical[ly],”195
consistently using Bivens cases to develop the qualified immunity
190. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–37 (adding that “[d]istrict courts and courts of
appeals with heavy caseloads are often understandably unenthusiastic about what
may seem to be an essentially academic exercise”).
191. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). But see Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 555–56 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that the Court is taxing judicial resources by permitting interlocutory appeals in qualified immunity cases).
192. The Court has never directly addressed this issue but has repeatedly
placed the burden of the clearly established test on plaintiffs. See, e.g., Plumhoff v.
Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779–80 (2014); Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna 142 S. Ct. 4, 8
(2021) (“Cortesluna [plaintiff] must identify a case that put Rivas-Villegas [defendant] on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful.”). Before Plumhoff, the
circuit courts were deeply split on the relevant burdens for assessing qualified immunity. Kenneth Duvall, Burdens of Proof and Qualified Immunity, 37 S. ILL.
UNIV. L.J. 135, 143–45 (2012). Despite the Court’s unexamined application of the
burden to plaintiffs, the circuits are still split over the issue. Compare Jefferson v.
Lias, 21 F.4th 74, 80 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[T]he officer bears the burden of establishing
his entitlement to qualified immunity at summary judgment.”), with Kokesh v.
Curlee, 14 F.4th 382, 392 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[P]laintiff has the burden to negate the
defense once it is properly raised.”) (citation omitted).
193. See, e.g., Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 328–31 (5th Cir. 2020) (discussing how qualified immunity “involves significant departures from the norms of civil
litigation”). Under the earlier regime of good-faith immunity, the Court explicitly
held the defendant bore the burden of establishing his entitlement to immunity.
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S 635, 638–41 (1980); id. at 640 (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
8(c); 5 CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1271 (1969)).
194. Despite the Court’s aggressive approach with qualified immunity, there
are reasons to be cautiously optimistic that the Court is currently uncomfortable
with the doctrine and may be recalibrating, if not reconsidering, it. See Jaicomo &
Bidwell, supra note 87, at 130–40.
195. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); see also Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 394 n.9 (1989).
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doctrine and make it increasingly difficult to hold any government
officials accountable.196
C. Over the past four decades, the Court has dramatically
weakened Bivens.
By the time it used Bivens to create qualified immunity in
Harlow, the Supreme Court had approved, permitted, or implied
causes of action against federal officials in a variety of contexts.197
But at the same time the Court was relying on the availability of
Bivens claims to build up an increasingly sturdy qualified immunity,
it was stripping Bivens to the studs.
In 1983, the Court in Bush v. Lucas held that the existence of
“an elaborate, comprehensive scheme” addressing “federal personnel policy” displaced a Bivens claim in the same context.198 On that
same day, the Court denied Bivens claims to naval-enlisted men for
racial discrimination in Chappell v. Wallace.199 There the court relied on “the unique disciplinary structure of the military . . . and
Congress’ activity in the field” as special factors to disclaim a Bivens remedy.200
196. More than one-third of the Court’s qualified immunity decisions were
entered in Bivens cases. See infra Appendix B.
197. See infra Appendix A (listing nine cases before Harlow).
198. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380–90 (1983). Like Harlow, Bush involved
a First Amendment employment retaliation claim, though Bush did not cite
Harlow. See id. As it would continue to do in restricting Bivens, the Court purported to avoid doing policy—declining to “decide whether or not it would be
good policy to permit a federal employee to recover damages” for First Amendment violations. Id. at 390. But by declining to permit a constitutional cause of
action, the Court did the very sort of policy courts historically considered an invasion of the legislative role[:] weighing the costs and benefits of enforcing the law
rather than neutrally enforcing it without regard to those costs and benefits. See,
e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 366–67 (1824); Entick v. Carrington
(1765) 19 How. St. Tri. 1029, 1067 (K.B.); see also supra note 49.
199. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 297–98 (1983).
200. Id. at 304. To highlight the importance of congressional control over the
military, the Court relied heavily on its decision in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 (1950). In Feres, the Court slashed an atextual, policy-based exception into the
FTCA, precluding tort claims incident to military service. Id. at 138–46. Thus, the
Court’s basis for concluding that Congress had not taken affirmative action to permit claims incident to military service was an exception the Court created to affirmative Congressional action that did permit such claims. Noting that the text of the
FTCA, “it is said, should persuade us to cast upon Congress . . . the task of qualifying and clarifying its language if the liability here asserted should prove so depleting of the public treasury as the Government fears,” Feres rejected Congressional
control because, although the FTCA provided for non-combat military claims, “it
remains for courts . . . to determine whether any claim is recognizable in law.” Id.
at 139–41. But see United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[N]either the three original Feres reasons nor the post hoc rationalization of military discipline justifies our failure to apply the FTCA as written. Feres
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Then, in Schweiker v. Chilicky, the Court held that Bivens
claims were unavailable for the denial of Social Security benefits,
owing to the size and complexity of the Social Security system.201
Those three cases dispensed with the requirement of explicit statutory displacement of Bivens in Davis and Carlson and instead implied displacement where a statutory scheme was sufficiently
comprehensive or byzantine.202 Through the special-factors test, the
Court cleaved claims implicating federal employment, welfare, and
military policy from Bivens’s general recognition of constitutional
claims against federal officials.
Cautiously shifting the Court’s focus from institutional competence toward the separation of powers,203 Schweiker explained “the
was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the widespread, almost universal criticism it has received.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Kaitlan
Price, Comment, Feres: The “Double-edged Sword,” 125 DICK. L. REV. 745,
754–56 (2021) (detailing criticisms of the Feres doctrine). Moreover, Chappell’s
premise that Congress’s authority in the field of military discipline precludes courts
from providing remedies against military officers defies the many early cases in
which the Court provided such remedies. See, e.g., Murry v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115 (1851). See generally
supra Section I.B–C.
The Court reaffirmed Chappell in United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987),
by denying a Bivens claim to an Army sergeant who was one of 1,000 soldiers
secretly drugged with LSD by military intelligence and CIA operatives as part of a
covert program in the 1950s. Accord WORMWOOD (Netflix 2017) (investigating the
mysterious death of American biological warfare scientist Frank Olson, who fell
from a hotel window in 1953 after having been surreptitiously dosed with LSD by a
CIA agent as part of Project MKUltra). Relying on a “policy judgment” “protective of military concerns,” the Court held that Chappell precluded Bivens claims,
observing that the “incident to service” test was easy to administer. Stanley, 483
U.S. at 681–83. Incidentally, Justice Scalia, who authored Stanley, attempted to
justify the apparent conflict between Stanley and his dissent in Johnson attacking
the Feres doctrine by noting that, as an alternative to relying on Feres, the Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces.” Stanley, 483 U.S. at 681–82, 682 n.5 (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14).
201. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424, 426–27 (1988) (relying substantially on Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983)).
202. Moreover, both Davis and Carlson explained that the availability of an
immunity would preclude the existence of “special factors.” See supra note 141; see
also, e.g., Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 207 (1985) (denying federal prison
officials absolute immunity for constitutional claims and indicating the breadth of
Bivens by explaining that qualified immunity “will ensure that federal officials are
not harassed by frivolous lawsuits” as it had for the officials in Butz (Secretary of
Agriculture), Harlow (Presidential Aides), and Mitchell (Attorney General)).
Neither Bush nor Chappell nor Schweiker addressed the effect of immunity on the
special-factors test.
203. Compare Bush, 462 U.S. at 388–89 (noting that in light of the history and
development of civil service remedies Congress was better suited to balance the
relevant policy concerns), with Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 422 (citing Chappell and
Stanley for the proposition that Congress had explicit constitutional authority in
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concept of ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress has proved to include an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction has
not been inadvertent.”204 Thus, when Congress enacted the Westfall
Act—just five months after Schweiker was decided—and affirmatively approved “civil action[s] against . . . employee[s] of the Government . . . brought for a violation of the Constitution of the
United States,” while at the same time prohibiting suits against federal officials in state courts,205 the Court should have halted its erosion of Bivens.206 It did not.
During the 1990s the Court restricted Bivens, but only once. In
FDIC v. Meyer, the Court held that Bivens claims could not be asserted against a federal agency.207 The Court justified its restriction
as a protection of Bivens, concluding that allowing claims against
the field of military policy). Even so, Schweiker did not generally cite the separation of powers as a basis for denying federal claims but fell back on institutional
competencies. 487 U.S. at 423.
204. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423. The Court’s approach to the special-factors
test introduced in Bush conflicted with Davis and Carlson, which both required
that Congress explicitly displace Bivens with a competing statutory remedy.
205. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2). Like the creation of qualified immunity, “the
Westfall Act assumes the routine availability of a Bivens remedy.” Pfander &
Baltmanis, supra note 75, at 134. Not just through its explicit language, but through
its structural implications. By removing the availability of state common law as a
mechanism to vindicate constitutional violations, Congress fundamentally changed
the remedial scheme in place when Bivens was decided and the preceding two
centuries. See supra Sections I–II.B and note 30.
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A). The Court has since recognized that “[b]y enacting [the Westfall Act], Congress made clear that it was not attempting to abrogate Bivens” but that the Act “left Bivens where it found it” in 1988. Hernandez v.
Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 748 n.9 (2020); see also United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160,
166–67, 173 (1991) (noting that through the Westfall Act Congress expressly
“preserv[ed] employee liability for Bivens actions”); Smith, 499 U.S. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the Department of Justice’s explanation that, through
the Westfall Act, Congress “ma[d]e explicit what it had assumed all along: that
victims of constitutional violations would remain free to pursue a remedy against
the individual employee”); James E. Pfander & Neil Aggarwal, Bivens, The Judgment Bar, and the Perils of Dynamic Textualism, 8 U. SAINT THOMAS L.J. 417, 474
(2011) (“[T]o the extent Congress has spoken in the succeeding years, its enactments in 1974 and 1988 seek to preserve and accommodate the Bivens action
rather than displace it.”). By 1988, the Court had only carved three limited exceptions via Bush, Chappell, and Schweiker into the general rule from Bivens “that a
citizen suffering a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest could
invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain an
award of monetary damages against the responsible federal official.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). Thus, the Westfall Act preserved a still-broad form
of Bivens. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 75, at 122–24. For a more comprehensive analysis of the Westfall Act and its relationship to the Bivens doctrine, see
generally id.; Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall
Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (2013).
207. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994).
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federal agencies would diminish the importance of Bivens claims
against individual federal officials.208
The turn of the 21st century brought a new level of hostility
toward Bivens from the Court, beginning with Correctional Services
Corp. v. Malesko.209 In its outcome, Malesko did little more than
apply Meyer to bar Bivens claims against private corporations running federal prisons. The Court’s analysis was more pernicious. Although Bivens announced a generally available remedy subject to
two narrow exceptions (seemingly abrogated by the Westfall
Act),210 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Malesko reconceptualized the Bivens cause of action as one generally unavailable, unless the Court had explicitly granted an extension into a specific
“new context.”211 It also reimagined the Court’s earlier restriction
of Bivens, decided on a case-by-case assessment of institutional
competencies,212 as actually resting on “bedrock principles of separation of powers.”213 Separately concurring, Justice Scalia attacked
Bivens as “a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed
common-law powers to create causes of action . . . by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition,” suggesting Bivens went against the Court’s recent refusal to imply statutory
remedies in Alexander v. Sandoval.214
208. Id. at 485 (“If we were to imply a damages action directly against federal
agencies, thereby permitting claimants to bypass qualified immunity, there would
be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring damages actions against individual officers. Under Meyer’s regime, the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be
lost.”).
209. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
210. See supra notes 205–06; accord supra note 142. Relatedly, Congress further confirmed the availability of Bivens claims—at least those brought by prisoners—by amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1995 to require exhaustion
of administrative remedies before federal prisoners could pursue constitutional
claims. Accord Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739–41 (2001).
211. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70, 74. The Court contended in Malesko that in the
previous 30 years, the Court had “only” extended Bivens twice (in Davis and Carlson) and “consistently” refused to otherwise extend Bivens (in Bush, Chappell,
Schweiker, Stanley, and Meyer). Id. at 66–69. Setting aside the Court’s creative
comparative language—that it had “only” explicitly permitted Bivens 3 times but
“consistently” restricted it 5 times—the Court ignored the 19 other cases in which
it had presumed or otherwise permitted Bivens claims to go forward. See infra
Appendix A.
212. See supra note 203, infra note 230.
213. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69.
214. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). The Court continued to advance this new characterization of Bivens in Wilkie v. Robbins, where it declined to “devise a new Bivens damages action for
retaliate[ion] against the exercise of ownership rights” by Bureau of Land Management agents for their death-by-a-thousand-cuts retaliation campaign against a
landowner who had refused to grant the government an easement. Wilkie v. Rob-
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In 2017, the Court synthesized its modern distaste for Bivens in
Ziglar v. Abbasi.215 Abbasi involved claims against high-level federal officials for policy decisions made in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.216 Finding that it was “a significant
step under separation-of-powers principles for a court to determine
that it has the authority, under the judicial power, to create and
enforce a cause of action for damages against federal officials,” the
Court held that, absent an act of Congress, “expanding the Bivens
remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”217
Abbasi’s assertion rested—like Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
Malesko—on the Court’s jurisprudence concerning statutory, not
constitutional, causes of action.218 And while the Court acknowledged that statutory remedies involved different considerations
than constitutional remedies,219 it treated both identically to justify
restricting Bivens. Abbasi announced that the extension of Bivens
into a “new context” would be permitted only when there are no
“special factors counselling hesitation.”220
bins, 551 U.S. 537, 549, 555 (2007). The Court also, citing Wilkie and Malesko,
denied the availability of Bivens claims against the individual employees of federal
prison contractors—relying mainly on the availability of state tort remedies. Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 127 (2012).
215. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856 (2017).
216. Id. at 1851–54.
217. Id. at 1856–57 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).
While the Court has never overruled Carlson or Davis (and confronted the stare
decisis issues necessary to accomplish that), this articulation of the law inverted the
special-factors test set out in those cases. It also goes against the Court’s recent
observation that damages remedies against federal officials have “coexisted with
our constitutional system since the dawn of the Republic” and that “there may be
policy reasons why Congress may wish to shield Government employees from personal liability, and Congress is free to do so. But there are no constitutional reasons why we must do so in its stead.” Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 493 (2020).
218. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1855–56 (citing, among others, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)).
219. Id. at 1856. The Court reasoned:
When Congress enacts a statute, there are specific procedures and times
for considering its terms and the proper means for its enforcement. It is
logical, then, to assume that Congress will be explicit if it intends to create a private cause of action. With respect to the Constitution, however,
there is no single, specific congressional action to consider and interpret.
Id.; see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (“[T]he question of who
may enforce a statutory right is fundamentally different from the question of who
may enforce a right that is protected by the Constitution. . . . [T]he judiciary is
clearly discernible as the primary means through with [constitutional] rights may
be enforced.”) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819)); Carlos M.
Vázquez, Bivens and the Ancien Régime, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1923, 1927–28
(2021).
220. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18
(1980)).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-3\DIK302.txt

758

unknown

Seq: 40

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

3-MAY-22

12:34

[Vol. 126:719

The Court then announced a new two-step test to evaluate the
availability of Bivens claims. The first step asks whether a case
presents a “new context.”221 If the answer is no, the inquiry stops
there, and the plaintiff may proceed with the claim.222 If the answer
is yes, the inquiry continues to the second step, which asks whether
there are “special factors counselling hesitation” against expanding
Bivens.223 If no such factors exist, the claim may proceed. Otherwise, a constitutional remedy is unavailable.224
Abbasi explained that a case presents a new context when it is
“different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided
by this Court”225—providing a non-exhaustive list of meaningful
differences.226 Finding that claims against high-level officials for
policymaking were unlike the claims in Bivens, Davis, and Carlson,
the Court held that the claims presented a new context.227 For that
reason, the Court considered whether there were “special factors
counselling hesitation” against permitting a Bivens remedy in a new
context.228
Abbasi wrote that the Court had never defined the phrase
“special factors counseling hesitation.”229 But Abbasi inferred from
earlier cases that “the inquiry must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to
consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages
221. See id. at 1859–60.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 1860.
224. See id. at 1859.
225. Id. at 1859. The Court cited Bivens, Davis, and Carlson as the only cases
in which it had approved a Bivens claims. Id. at 1860. But see cases cited infra
Appendix A. The first step of the Abbasi test embodied the Court’s shift of Bivens
from a generally available remedy, subject only to the narrow exception of the
special-factors test before Malesko, to a generally prohibited remedy outside of the
specific factual contexts of Bivens, Davis, and Carlson. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at
1860.
226. Id. at 1859. The Court listed as meaningful differences: (1) rank of the
officers involved; (2) constitutional right at issue; (3) generality or specificity of the
official action; (4) extent of judicial guidance about how an officer should respond
to the problem; (5) statutory mandate under which the officer was operating; (6)
risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of the other
branches; or (7) presence of potential factors previous Bivens cases did not consider. Id. at 1860.
227. Id. at 1860–63. But see, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 481–83
(1978) (denying absolute immunity to the Secretary of Agriculture, et al., for policy-related actions).
228. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1848. The second step of the Abbasi test embodied
the Court’s transition from using policy to create immunities from constitutional
claims, e.g. Harlow, to using policy to bar those claims altogether, e.g. Bush. Id.
229. Id. at 1857.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-3\DIK302.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 41

UNQUALIFIED IMMUNITY

3-MAY-22

12:34

759

action to proceed” and provided another non-exhaustive list.230 The
Court concluded there were factors counseling hesitation in Abbasi,
denied a remedy, and provided the federal defendants de facto absolute immunity.231
While Abbasi maintained that the Court’s disfavor of Bivens
was grounded in the separation of powers,232 its special-factors
analysis is indistinguishable from the Court’s earlier policy justifications for creating and extending immunities.233 The Court continued its reliance on policy concerns several years later to further
restrict Bivens in Hernandez v. Mesa.
In Hernandez, the Court applied the Abbasi test to deny a Bivens remedy to the family of a Mexican child shot and killed over the
U.S.-Mexico border by a Customs and Border Protection Agent—
leaving the family with no remedy at all.234 Again purporting to
230. Id. at 1857–58. The Court listed as special factors whether extending Bivens into a new context would (1) call into question the formulation or implementation of a general policy; (2) interfere with sensitive functions of the Executive
Branch, such as national security or military discipline; or (3) overlap with an alternative method of relief. Id. at 1858, 1860–61. The focus on whether courts are “well
suited” to “weigh the costs and benefits” (i.e., do policy) demonstrates that the test
does not reflect concerns over the separation of powers. See id. at 1857–58. Abbasi
does not determine which branch has the constitutional authority to do policy, but
instead which branch would be better at it. See also supra note 203, infra note 233.
231. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860–63 (citing as special factors that alternative
methods of relief were available to the plaintiffs and that their claims would call
into question general policies, prevent execute branch officers from devoting the
necessary time and effort to properly discharge their duties, interfere in executive
functions, and implicate issues of national security).
232. See, e.g., id. at 1857 (asserting that the Legislature is in a better position
to consider imposing new substantive legal liability). But see supra note 235.
233. See Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 296 (1988) (citing Howard v. Lyons,
360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959)). Highlighting policy’s central role in court-created immunities, the Westfall court provided:
[T]he scope of absolute official immunity afforded federal employees is a
matter of federal law, “to be formulated by the courts in the absence of
legislative action by Congress.” The purpose of such official immunity is
not to protect an erring official, but to insulate the decisionmaking process from the harassment of prospective litigation. The provision of immunity rests on the view that the threat of liability will make federal
officials unduly timid in carrying out their official duties, and that effective government will be promoted if officials are freed of the costs of
vexatious and often frivolous damages suits.
Id.; see also id. at 296 n.3 (observing that the Court’s approach to immunities is
“functional” and requires the Court to weigh “the benefits of immunity” against
the costs); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982) (using the same policy
justification to create qualified immunity); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 503
(1978) (explaining that federal courts were competent “to determine the appropriate level of immunity where a suit is a direct claim under the Federal Constitution
against a federal officer”).
234. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 760 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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honor the separation of powers and avoid doing policy—a power
the Court found constitutionally afforded to Congress235—the Hernandez Court relied on wide-ranging policy considerations to restrict Bivens. Using the special-factors analysis, the Court delved
deeply into foreign policy, national security, drug policy, border security, immigration policy, and international relations.236 Citing numerous government reports, the Court weighed, for example, the
importance of Executive Branch oversight over officer accountability, the morale of American officials, Mexican criminal process, the
role of diplomacy, statistics about the amount of cross-border traffic
in people and drugs, appropriate uses and levels of force, and terrorism concerns.237 It concluded, therefrom, that permitting a Bivens claim would invade Congressional policymaking.238
Nevertheless, and despite Abbasi’s clear statement that Bivens
continues in force (at least in its original context and the contexts
approved in Davis and Carlson239), Abbasi and Hernandez have
been interpreted to limit Bivens to its precise facts by scholars and
235. See id. at 749–50. Hernandez also attributed the Court’s hostility toward
Bivens to “the demise of federal general common law” in Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), and, along with it “a federal court’s authority to
recognize a damages remedy” absent a Congressional statute. Hernandez, 140 S.
Ct. at 742. The Court’s reliance on Erie in this context has been called into question. See Vladeck, supra note 6, at 1887–89.
236. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 744–50.
237. Id. at 744–46.
238. Id. at 750. This understanding of the separation of powers inverted the
Constitutional order in existence at the Founding. See Entick v. Carrington (1765)
19 How. St. Tri. 1029, 1067 (K.B.). At that time, a substantive right guaranteed a
cause of action. See Uzuegbunam v. Prezcewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 799 (citing Ashby
v. White (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137; 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953) (“[T]he action on the
case is a proper action” because “surely every injury imports a damage. . . .”);
supra note 31. And the Court’s sole focus in such an action was to assess if the law
was violated and, if it was, apply an appropriate remedy. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362, 366 (1824); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220–21 (1882). The
early courts were resolute that to consider policy and provide defendants exceptions or immunities would invade the legislative role. The Apollon, 22 U.S. at 366;
Lee, 106 U.S. at 220–21; Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 135–36
(1851); Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1067. But, as Abbasi and Hernandez demonstrate, the Court now believes the judicial role is to weigh policy to determine
whether constitutional rights should yield to the Court’s concerns about the public
mischiefs enforcing those rights might permit. See generally Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.
Ct. 1843 (2017); Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
239. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856. While Abbasi expressed caution about implied
causes of action, the Court was emphatic that its opinion did not “cast doubt on
the continued force, or even the necessity, of Bivens in the search-and-seizure context in which it arose.” Id. The Court explained: “The settled law of Bivens in this
common and recurrent sphere of law enforcement, and the undoubted reliance
upon it as a fixed principle in the law, are powerful reasons to retain it in that
sphere.” Id. at 1857.
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lower courts.240 Today, “[t]he Bivens doctrine, if not overruled, has
certainly been overtaken.”241
CONCLUSION
Just like it did in Butz, the Court today routinely proclaims that
state and federal officers are bound by the same Constitution in the
same way. When it comes to the Bill of Rights, “there is no daylight
between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires.”242
But when it comes to holding individual federal officials accountable for their unconstitutional acts, there is.
Even though damages have been available as a remedy against
federal officials as long as there have been federal officials,243 the
modern Court has created a legal system where they are almost entirely out of reach. Worse still, the Court relied on the availability of
a robust Bivens action against federal officials to justify its creation
of qualified immunity out of whole cloth. Now, qualified immunity
shields state and local officials from constitutional accountability—
even when they act maliciously244 or recklessly245—while the
Court’s restriction of Bivens means that federal officials often enjoy
240. See Daniel B. Rice & Jack Boeglin, Confining Cases to Their Facts, 105
VA. L. REV. 865, 882–84 (2019); see, e.g., Ahmed v. Weyker, 984 F.3d 564, 568–71
(8th Cir. 2020) (holding that any case that does not “exactly mirror[ ] the facts and
legal issues” in Bivens presents a new context and that the separation of powers is
itself a “special factor” precluding Bivens in a new context); Byrd v. Lamb, 990
F.3d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that “virtually everything” outside of the
specific facts of Bivens is a new context and that Congress’ failure to enact a statutory remedy is a “special factor”).
241. Byrd, 990 F.3d at 883 (Willett, J., concurring). Notwithstanding this perception, the Court has, including after Hernandez, regularly permitted or implied
the availability of Bivens in dozens of cases. See infra Appendix A (citing Supreme
Court cases that recognized, implied, or allowed to go forward constitutional
claims against federal officers); accord Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 500 (2004)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that the Court’s permission of Guantanamo Bay
detainees to file writs of habeas corpus implies that “all United States law applies
there—including . . . the federal cause of action recognized in Bivens”); Boyle v.
United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 505 (1988) (“Another area we have found to be
of peculiarly federal concern . . . is the civil liability of federal officials for actions
taken in the course of their duty.”).
242. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019).
243. See supra Section I (tracing the unbroken line of cases from the Founding in which the Supreme Court applied strict liability to federal officials for actions that exceeded their authority).
244. See, e.g., supra note 168.
245. See, e.g., Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2019) (granting qualified immunity to a police officer who shot a child while trying to kill a
nonthreatening family dog); West v. City of Caldwell, 931 F.3d 978, 981–82, 984–85
(9th Cir. 2019) (granting qualified immunity to police who fired gas grenades into a
woman’s home, despite her providing her keys and permission to enter the home
to look for a suspect who was not there).
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an unqualified, absolute immunity—even if their actions are egregious enough to preclude qualified immunity.246 The Bill of Rights
sometimes still watches over the actions of state and local officials,
but the Court has blinded it to their federal peers.
Butz warned that such a legal system would stand American
constitutional design on its head.247 But the Supreme Court has betrayed Butz, changing its statement of an obvious and historically
unflinching principle of constitutional accountability248 into a frustrating question:
Surely, federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of protection when they violate federal constitutional rules than do state
officers?

246. Following Abbasi, there has been an alarming trend of lower courts denying qualified immunity to federal officials but shielding them with absolute immunity instead. See, e.g., Byrd, 990 F.3d 879 (finding Bivens claims unavailable on
appeal, despite the district court’s denial of qualified immunity); see also Ahmed v.
Weyker, 984 F.3d 564 (8th Cir. 2020) (same); Oliva v. Nivar, 973 U.S. 438 (5th Cir.
2020) (same); Farah v. Weyker, 926 U.S. 492 (8th Cir. 2019) (same).
247. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
248. Id. at 501.
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DECISIONS RECOGNIZING,

IMPLYING, OR ALLOWING TO GO FORWARD
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AGAINST
FEDERAL OFFICIALS:

Case
Brownback v. King,
141 S. Ct. 740 (2021)
Simmons v. Himmelreich,
578 U.S. 621 (2016)
Wood v. Moss,
572 U.S. 744 (2014)
Reichle v. Howards,
566 U.S. 658 (2012)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
536 U.S. 731 (2011)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009)
Hartman v. Moore,
547 U.S. 250 (2006)
Will v. Hallock,
546 U.S. 345 (2006)
Groh v. Ramirez,
540 U.S. 551 (2004)
Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001)
Hanlon v. Berger,
526 U.S. 808 (1999)
Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603 (1999)
Behrens v. Pelletier,
516 U.S. 299 (1996)
Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825 (1994)
Antoine v. Byers &
Anderson, Inc.,
508 U.S. 429 (1993)
McCarthy v. Madigan,
503 U.S. 140 (1992)
Hunter v. Bryant,
502 U.S. 224 (1991)
Siegert v. Gilley,
500 U.S. 226 (1991)
Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635 (1987)
Cleavinger v. Saxner,
474 U.S. 193 (1985)

Official
FBI Agent,
Task Force Officers
Prison Officials

Claim
4th Amendment
(Search/Seizure, Excessive Force)
8th Amendment
(Deliberate Indifference to Safety)
Secret Service Agents 1st Amendment
(Viewpoint Discrimination)
Secret Service Agents 1st & 4th Amendments
(Retaliation, Search/Seizure)
Attorney General
4th Amendment
(Seizure)
Attorney General
1st & 5th Amendments
(Discrimination)
Postal Inspectors
1st Amendment
(Retaliation)
Customs Agents
5th Amendment
(Due Process)
ATF Agent
4th Amendment
(Search)
Military Police
4th Amendment
Officer
(Excessive Force)
Fish & Wildlife
4th Amendment
Officers
(Search)
U.S. Marshals
4th Amendment
(Search)
Banking Regulator
5th Amendment
(Due Process)
Prison Officials
8th Amendment
(Deliberate Indifference to Safety)
Court Reporter
5th Amendment
(Due Process)
Prison Officials,
Medical Personnel

8th Amendment
(Deliberate Indifference
to Medical Needs)
Secret Service Agents 4th Amendment
(Seizure)
Hospital
5th Amendment
Administrator
(Due Process)
FBI Agent
4th Amendment
(Search)
Prison Officials
1st, 4th, 5th, 6th & 8th
Amendments
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Case
Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511 (1985)
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982)
Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14 (1980)

Official
Attorney General

Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979)
Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478 (1978)
G.M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States,
429 U.S. 338 (1977)
United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974)
District of Columbia v.
Carter,
409 U.S. 418 (1973)
Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306 (1973)

Congressman

Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971)
Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946)

Seq: 46

Presidential Aides
Prison Officials

Department of
Agriculture Officials
IRS Agents

FBI Agents
D.C. Police
Officer

3-MAY-22

12:34
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Claim
4th Amendment
(Search/Seizure)
1st Amendment
(Retaliation)
8th Amendment
(Deliberate Indifference
to Medical Needs)
5th Amendment
(Due Process)
1st Amendment
(Retaliation)
4th Amendment
(Search/Seizure)
4th Amendment
(Search/Seizure)
4th Amendment
(Seizure, Excessive Force)

Congressional
Committee
Members
Narcotics Agents

4th Amendment
(Privacy)

FBI Agents

4th Amendment
(Search/Seizure)

4th Amendment
(Search/Seizure, Excessive Force)

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-3\DIK302.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 47

3-MAY-22

UNQUALIFIED IMMUNITY

12:34

765

APPENDIX B
SUPREME COURT APPLICATIONS OF THE QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY STANDARD FROM 1982 THROUGH 2021:249
Case
Rivas-Villegas v.
Cortesluna,†
142 S. Ct. 4 (2021)
City of Tahlequah v.
†
Bond,
142 S. Ct. 9 (2021)
Taylor v. Riojas,†
141 S. Ct. 52 (2020)
City of Escondido v.
†
Emmons,*
139 S. Ct. 500 (2019)
Kisela v. Hughes,†
138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018)
District of Columbia v.
Wesby,
138 S. Ct. 577 (2018)
Hernandez v. Mesa,*
137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017)
Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017)
White v. Pauly,*†
137 S. Ct. 548 (2017)
Mullenix v. Luna,†
577 U.S. 7 (2015)
Taylor v. Barkes,†
575 U.S. 822 (2015)
City and County of
San Francisco v.
Sheehan,
575 U.S. 600 (2015)
Carroll v. Carman,†
574 U.S. 13 (2014)
Lane v. Franks,
573 U.S. 228 (2014)

Official

Claim

Merits Lower
Reached Court
No
9th
Cir.

Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

No

10th
Cir.

State Prison
Officials
Local Law
Enforcement

8th Amendment

Yes

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

No

5th
Cir.
9th
Cir.

Local Law
Enforcement
Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)
4th Amendment
(Seizure)

No

Federal Law
Enforcement
(Border Patrol)
DOJ and Federal
Prison Officials
State Law
Enforcement
State Law
Enforcement
State Prison
Officials
Local Law
Enforcement

5th Amendment
(Due Process)

No

5th
Cir.

5th Amendment
(Equal Protection)
4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)
4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)
8th Amendment

No

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

No

2d
Cir.
10th
Cir.
5th
Cir.
3d
Cir.
9th
Cir.

State Law
Enforcement
State College
President

4th Amendment
(Search)
1st Amendment
(Retaliation)

No

Yes

No
No
No

Yes

9th
Cir.
D.C.
Cir.

3d
Cir.
11th
Cir.

249. Cases where the Court found no immunity are indicated in bold, cases
remanded for further determination of immunity by an asterisk, and summary
reversals by a dagger. This table was previously included in Jaicomo & Bidwell,
supra note 87, at 141–44, and originally adapted from Baude, supra note 6, at
88–90.
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Plumhoff v. Rickard,
572 U.S. 765 (2014)
Wood v. Moss,
572 U.S. 744 (2014)
Stanton v. Sims,†
571 U.S. 3 (2013)
Reichle v. Howards,
566 U.S. 658 (2012)

Filarsky v. Delia,
566 U.S. 377 (2012)
Messerschmidt v.
Millender,
565 U.S. 535 (2012)
Ryburn v. Huff,†
565 U.S. 469 (2012)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731 (2011)
Safford Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. Redding,
557 U.S. 364 (2009)
Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223 (2009)
Brosseau v. Haugen,†
543 U.S. 194 (2004)
Groh v. Ramirez,
540 U.S. 551 (2004)
Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730 (2002)
Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001)
Hanlon v. Berger,†
526 U.S. 808 (1999)
Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603 (1999)
Hunter v. Bryant,†
502 U.S. 224 (1991)

Official
Local Law
Enforcement
Federal Law
Enforcement
(Secret Service)
Local Law
Enforcement
Federal Law
Enforcement
(Secret Service)

Claim

12:34

[Vol. 126:719
Merits Lower
Reached Court
Yes
6th
Cir.
No
9th
Cir.

City Outside
Counsel
Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)
1st Amendment
(Viewpoint
Discrimination)
4th Amendment
(Illegal Entry)
1st & 4th
Amendments
(Retaliation,
Search/Seizure)
4th Amendment
(Search)
4th Amendment
(Search/Seizure)

Local Law
Enforcement
U.S. Attorney
General
Local School
Officials

4th Amendment
(Search)
4th Amendment
(Arrest)
4th Amendment
(Search)

Yes

State Law
Enforcement
Local Law
Enforcement
Federal Law
Enforcement
(ATF)
State Prison
Officials
Federal Law
Enforcement
(Military Police)
Federal Law
Enforcement
(Fish and Wildlife)
State and Federal
Law Enforcement
(U.S. Marshals)
Federal Law
Enforcement
(Secret Service)

4th Amendment
(Illegal Entry)
4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)
4th Amendment
(Search)

No

8th Amendment

Yes

4th Amendment
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